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Abstract
This Article has five parts. Part I sets out and adopts the basic premises of the jurisprudential
perspective championed by Professor Reisman and sketches his argument that legal solutions can
always be fashioned in a meaningful and realistic manner. Part II discusses the development
of ISIL in the Middle East. Part III analyzes the lawlessness problem created by ISIL for the
affected local communities and explains how loss of control, left unattended, transforms into a
loss of authority of prescription by destroying the social fabric needed for legal processes to have
meaning. Part IV develops how municipal lawlessness has a contagion effect on the international
plane through what this Article calls the transnational transference of lawlessness by comparing
international legal reactions to ISIL’s putative establishment of a caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Part
V sketches how the contagion effect can be stopped by means of the diagnostic tools developed
in Parts III and IV. The Article demonstrates that both public debate and scholarly engagement so
far have focused on the wrong question: whether or how to use force to wrest control of territory
from ISIL. Given the progression of lawlessness from loss of control to loss of authority mapped
in Part III of the Article, this incorrect focus is understandable. But to be effective, the debate
instead must focus directly on how authoritative decision-making processes can be rekindled and
protected in Syria, Iraq, and beyond. These structures were degraded not just by ISIL, which may
well be a symptom of failing authority structures rather than its proximate cause; in fact, these
structures were sabotaged by Western and Ottoman colonial powers long before ISIL sought its
opportunity on Arabian soil. Perhaps counter-intuitively, use of force that does not also address
and re-strengthen the social fabric in the region could well be worse long-term than no use of
force at all. Given the human toll in the region—and the role as other than an innocent bystander
of Western powers—the normative end of law should inspire us towards more effective—and more
authoritative—forms of intervention.
KEYWORDS: ISIL; Lawlessness; case study; problem; Syria; Consent-Based; Iraq; International
Law; threat
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INTRODUCTION 
Can the United States respond lawfully to persistent and intense 
episodes of lawlessness in the face of United Nations Security 
Council gridlock? The global reaction to the Daesh (or “Islamic State 
of Iraq and the Levant”  or “ISIL”) occupation of Syrian territory 
makes this more than an academic question. As it stands, significant 
weight of authority supports that US air strikes in Syria are unlawful 
despite the documented atrocities committed by ISIL (as well as 
Syrian government forces) upon the Syrian civilian population. 
This Article submits that academic and political commentators 
ask the wrong question. Lawlessness such as that currently witnessed 
in Syria is both absolute and impervious to legal response. Speaking 
of a lawful response in such circumstances is meaningless. This 
Article provides the first fully theorized account of lawlessness. This 
account begins with the domestic progression of lawlessness in three 
stages: (1) pragmatic lawlessness, constituting a temporary loss of 
control by the government apparatus; (2) formal lawlessness, 
constituting a loss of authority of the government apparatus; and (3) 
functional lawlessness, constituting a loss of the social fabric 
necessary to support any authoritative social decision. It theorizes that 
international law progressively loses its own authority to address 
lawlessness because of a transnational transference of lawlessness; 
this transference becomes complete at the functional lawlessness 
stage. The Article submits that lawlessness in Syria has reached 
functional levels. The Article theorizes finally that the United States 
must act to counteract the corrosive effect of functional lawlessness 
extra-legally in order to protect its national security interests and 
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forestall more serious systemic losses of authority on the international 
plane.  
Deploying this theoretical construct, the Article argues that 
academic and political commentators focus on a tool that is inefficient 
and potentially counterproductive, namely the escalation of purely 
coercive responses. The Article concludes that only policy responses 
specifically tailored to restore authority by strengthening the 
capabilities of those affected by lawlessness can be successful and 
provides specific policy proposals how to achieve this end. 
 
Der Knabe seufzt über's grüne Meer, 
Vom fernenden Ufer kam er her, 
Er wünscht sich mächtige Schwingen, 
Die sollten ihn ins heimische Land, 
Woran ihn ewige Sehnsucht mahnt, 
Im rauschenden Fluge bringen. 
- Franz Schubert, Atys, D.585.1 
 
When men commit unspeakable horrors before our eyes and we 
are powerless to stop them, the Western canon from Thucydides’ 
History of the Peloponnesian War onwards has mourned the end of 
law.2 What is more, the Western canon fears lawlessness as a 
contagious, consuming, and covetous force.3 ISIL, or Daesh, as it is 
                                                            
1.   “The boy sighs over the green sea,/ From a far shore came he here,/ He wishes for 
mighty wings:/ They should bring him to his home-country,/ Of which eternal longing reminds 
him,/ On sweeping pinions.” FRANZ SCHUBERT, ATYS, D.585 (1883), in SCHUBERT: 
MAYRHOFER-LIEDER, VOL. 2 (Naxos 2003), http://www.naxos.com/sungtext/PDF/8.5547
39.pdf. Johann Baptist Mayrhofer authored the original poem. 
2. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 302 (Martin Hammond trans., Oxford 
University Press 2009) (431-404 B.C.) (“You know as well as we do that when we are talking 
on the human plane questions of justice only arise when there is equal power to compel: in 
terms of practicality the dominant exact what they can and the weak concede what they 
must.”); see id. at 172 (“With all life thrown into chaos at this time of crisis for the city, human 
nature triumphed over law . . . ”).  
3. The linkage between lawlessness and plague are powerful in Western history and 
literature. See, e.g., RANDAL P. GARZA, UNDERSTANDING PLAGUE: THE MEDICAL AND 
IMAGINATIVE TEXTS OF MEDIEVAL SPAIN 19 (2008) (“In Thucydides’ view, such disregard of 
funerary practices combined with the human being’s inability prevent or cure the disease to 
lead to a general decline in the perceived value of human life. As a result, general lawlessness 
followed.”); ROBERT HOLLANDER, BOCCACCIO’S DANTE AND THE SHAPING FORCE OF 
SATIRE 121 (1997) (discussing the attempts by Boccaccio to re-theorize law from the 
lawlessness engendered by the plague through a social reconstitution of community). 
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known in the Middle East, now again brings us face to face with that 
force: ISIL proudly trumpets the vilest forms of cruelty it inflicts on 
those within its grasp.4 Daesh is not a transient terrorist threat but is 
conquering territory in the Middle East and beyond—and has 
succeeded in displacing weak and failing states in the region 5 The 
West appears singularly powerless to respond to ISIL;6 but averting 
its eyes is no longer possible either when the children of those fleeing 
from the massacres are washing dead upon our shores rather than 
dying in the ruins of a far off land.7  
Tragically, the West seems to be lost midway between continued 
isolationist denial and renewed interventionist fervor in its attempts to 
grapple with the crisis.8 International law, the straightforward path to 
address international lawlessness, has no manifest means to guide 
decision-making to face this new threat absent Security Council 
action, which as of today is unlikely to be decisive.9 So how can, and 
                                                            
4. See Rukmini Callimachi, ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theology-of-
rape.html (discussing the organized use of rape as a policy tool by ISIS); The Editorial Board, 
The Crimes of Palmyra, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/
opinion/the-crimes-of-palmyra.html (“The Islamic State, the ultrafundamentalist group better 
known as ISIS, has laid a trail of unspeakable horrors in its march through Syria and Iraq – 
videotaped beheadings, ritualized rape and all manner of grisly torture and murder of anyone 
who does not subscribe to its extreme version of Islam.”). 
5. Christina Pazzanese, The Islamic State of Play, HARV. GAZETTE, Oct. 24, 2014, 
http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2014/10/the-islamic-state-of-play/ (noting that what is 
distinctive about ISIL is its ability to hold territory). 
6. See Mark Mazzetti & Matt Apuzzo, Analysts Detail Claims That Reports on ISIS 
Were Distorted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/us/
politics/analysts-said-to-provide-evidence-of-distorted-reports-on-isis.html (detailing ongoing 
concerns that U.S. military reports on the success of air strikes against ISIL were exaggerated); 
see also Anne Barnard, Turkey’s Focus on Crushing Kurdish Separatists Complicates the 
Fight Against ISIS, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/world/
turkeys-focus-on-crushing-kurd-extremists-complicates-isis-efforts.html (noting that Turkish 
forces nominally allied with the U.S. in the fight against ISIL are attacking Kurdish fighters 
combatting ISIL); Krisztina Than & Ivana Sekularac, Hungary Shuts EU Border, Taking 
Migrant Crisis Into Its Own Hands, REUTERS, Sept. 16, 2015, http://in.reuters.com/article/
2015/09/15/europe-migrants-crisis-hungary-border-eu-idINKCN0RF1E120150915 (reporting 
moves made by Hungary to undermine relief efforts for the growing migrant humanitarian 
crisis). 
7. See Robert Mackey, Brutal Images of Syrian Boy Drowned Off Turkey Must Be Seen, 
Activists Say, N.Y. TIMES Sept. 2, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/world/
middleeast/brutal-images-of-syrian-boy-drowned-off-turkey-must-be-seen-activists-say.html.  
8. See supra note 6.  
9. See Krishnadev Calamur, Obama Has Support For Syria Strikes, But Are They 
Legal?, NPR (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/09/25/351433505/
obama-has-support-for-syria-strikes-but-are-they-legal (summarizing the academic positions 
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should, the United States and its allies react to the specter of ISIL’s 
apparently expanding lawless rule? 
Two opposing options come readily to mind. One approach is to 
abandon all hope of law and act decisively and unconstrainedly to 
purge the threat. Niccolò Machiavelli observed that “experience 
shows that in our times the rulers who have done great things are 
those who have set little store by keeping their word, being skillful 
rather in cunningly deceiving men; they have got the better of those 
who have relied on being trustworthy.”10 The “times” Machiavelli 
described were marred by deep crisis—law and civil society in 
Machiavelli’s native Florence had been eviscerated entirely by civil 
strife and war when Machiavelli wrote The Prince for Florence’s new 
ruler.11 In such times, Machiavelli advised, faithfulness—law—is a 
dangerous myth and rulers would be well advised to treat it as little 
more than one tool among others to re-establish order.12 The end—
and only the end—excuses the means.13 
                                                                                                                                     
regarding the questionable legality of strikes against ISIL in Syria under international law); 
Michelle Nichols, UN Security Council Adopts Resolution Stifling ISIS, Nusra Front Cash 
Flows, HAARETZ, Feb. 12, 2015, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.642279 (noting 
the geopolitical voting blocs obstructing more effective resolutions in the Security Council). 
10. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 61 (Quentin Skinner & Russell Price eds., 
1988) (1532). Machiavelli has had an enduring impact on relevant legal scholarship. See, e.g., 
Kenneth R. Mayer, Executive Power in the Obama Administration and the Decision to Seek 
Congressional Authorization for a Military Attack Against Syria: Implications for Theories of 
Unilateral Action, 4 UTAH L. REV. 821, 832 (2014) (discussing Machiavelli in the context of 
unilateral action against Syria); Julian Davis Mortenson, A Theory of Republican Prerogative, 
88 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 90-91 n.121 (2014) (discussing the impact of Machiavellian thought on 
executive action).  
11. See John Parkin, Dialogue in The Prince, in NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI’S THE PRINCE: 
NEW INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS 65, 71 (Martin Coyle ed., 1995) (“The metatextual 
reference to aiming high cited above, for example, is at once an introduction to further 
predictable examples of regal virtue (Moses, Cyrus, Romulus among them) and an incitement 
to the Medici to cultivate their virtù in the Machiavellian terms of energy, initiative, 
constitutional reform and armed force in whatever political context (Florence or elsewhere: it 
isn’t clear) they operate. . . . The point for him is to use this freedom to convert humanist 
commonplaces into something else while retaining some contact with humanism via for 
instance the classical notion of virtù itself.”); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN 
MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 
160-61 (2d ed. 2003) (noting the relationship between The Prince and overthrow or innovation 
in the context of a “society [that] is atomized into a chaos of unreconciled and conflicting 
wills”). 
12. See 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 186 
(1978) (“Machiavelli invariably sees the world of politics as one in which the rational methods 
of the law-giver must be supplemented at all times with the ferocity of the lion and the cunning 
of the fox.”). This, of course, is not the only possible interpretation of Machiavelli but one that 
has gained prevalence in contemporary political theory. While I adhere to this interpretation of 
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Professor W. Michael Reisman, a leading international legal 
theorist, rejects this answer. In his 2012 work, The Quest for World 
Order and Human Dignity in the Twenty-first Century, he adopts a 
functionalist approach.14 This approach allows him to diagnose and 
correct the problem of formalist legal analysis: crises reveal a clash 
between sovereignty-based and human-rights-based reasoning.15 
Professor Reisman’s approach is uniquely relevant because it is that 
very clash that perplexes the predominant academic responses to the 
policy choices made by Western powers in seeking to counter ISIL.16  
Noting the adage “silent enim leges inter arma” (“the laws fall 
mute in times of violence”), Professor Reisman submits that true 
                                                                                                                                     
Machiavelli, the Machiavellian point is intended as a conceptual starting point rather than 
purely textual exegesis.  
13. See id. at 184 n.1 (noting that the translation to make Machiavelli say the end 
justifies the means “is perhaps over-eager” because the “verbs Machiavelli uses – in 
characteristically epigrammatic juxtaposition – are accusare and scusare. The action itself 
accuses, but its outcome excuses (rather than justifies) its performance.”). 
14. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT 
(2012). On the importance of Michael Reisman in US legal scholarship, see Siegfried 
Wiessner, Law as a Means to a Public Order of Human Dignity: The Jurisprudence of 
Michael Reisman, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 525, passim (2009); Larry May, The UN Charter, 
Human Rights Law, and Contingent Pacifism, 23 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 37, 52-53 (2014) 
(noting the influence of Michael Reisman on questions of the use of force).  
15. See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 386-87 (discussing how such clashes can be 
reconciled). 
16. See Louise Arimatsu & Michael Schmitt, The Legal Basis for War Against ISIS 
Remains Contentious, GUARDIAN, Oct. 6, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2014/oct/06/legal-basis-war-isis-syria-islamic-state (“Most, if not all, international law experts 
agree that military operations against Isis in Iraq comport with international law. The same 
cannot be said of the operations against Isis in Syria.”); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Obama’s 
Illegal War, The Islamic State Never Attacked Us. So Why Are We Attacking Them?, 
POLITICO, Sept. 11, 2014, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/obamas-illegal-
war-10863_Page2.html (O’Connell teaches international law at Notre Dame); Dapo Akande & 
Zachary Vermeer, The Airstrikes Against Islamic State and the Alleged Prohibition on Military 
Assistance to Governments in Civil Wars, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.
ejiltalk.org/the-airstrikes-against-islamic-state-in-iraq-and-the-alleged-prohibition-on-military-
assistance-to-governments-in-civil-wars/; Raphael Van Steenberghe, The Alleged Prohibition 
on Intervening in Civil Wars Is Still Alive After Airstrikes Against Islamic State in Iraq: A 
Response to Dapo Akande and Zachary Vermeer, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 12, 2015), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-alleged-prohibition-on-intervening-in-civil-wars-is-still-alive-after-
the-airstrikes-against-islamic-state-in-iraq-a-response-to-dapo-akande-and-zachary-
vermeer/#more-13063; Jennifer Trahan, Pesky Questions of International Law: What’s the 
Basis for Air Strikes in Syria, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 23, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/
2014/09/23/guest-post-pesky-questions-international-law-whats-basis-air-strikes-syria/ (“Thus, 
while it is not impossible that air strikes in Syria could be justified under international law, the 
Administration still needs to demonstrate a solid legal foundation for them.”).  
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lawlessness, “transposed to the international political realm and 
international law [would be] utterly destructive.”17 Consequently, his 
treatment “reject[s] the notion that there are areas or sectors of 
international life in which lawful decisions which are contextually 
meaningful and yet realistic are not demanded and cannot be 
designed.”18 Professor Reisman explains that the problem is not one 
of lawlessness, as such, but one of “offshore zones” of international 
law in which the constitutive configuration of the process of 
authoritative international decision-making does not reflect highly 
effective hierarchical institutions.19 In these offshore zones, he 
submits, the design of a lawful decision does not, and cannot, follow a 
traditional textual-rule-based mode (determining and applying a 
relevant rule of law to the situation at hand) thus leading to the 
impression of lawlessness;20 instead, the non-hierarchical constitutive 
configuration of the international decision-making process requires a 
policy-context-based mode of decision-making (determining the 
appropriate goals for the problem being addressed and providing a 
strategic approach how best to make them effective).21 This mode, he 
submits, will maintain the ability to fashion international decisions 
that remain at the same time authoritative and controlling, and thus 
lawful.22  
This Article disagrees with Professor Reisman’s assessment and 
seeks to revise it in order to respond to current events. It submits that 
current events provide the exception that tends to prove Professor 
Reisman’s rule;23 here, the specific context of a terrorist network 
                                                            
17. REISMAN, supra note 14, at 21. 
18. Id. This statement has some overlap with constructivist theory. See Shima Baradaran 
et al., Does International Law Matter?, 97 MINN. L. REV. 743, 756-60 (2013) (summarizing 
constructivist theory of international norm creation and compliance). For the constructivist 
heritage of the New Haven School, see Anthony D’Amato, Non-State Actors from the 
Perspective of the Policy-Oriented School, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 64, 67 
(Jean d’Aspremont ed., 2011); Philip A. Karber, “Constructivism” as a Method in 
International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 189, 189, 192 (2000). 
19. REISMAN, supra note 14, at 117. 
20. See id. at 169-71. 
21. See id. at 169, 183-86. This feature is not accidental but one that is very much in the 
interest of the international community in order effectively to engage thorny policy issues 
defying ready codification.   
22. See id. at 433-54. 
23. See id. at 21 (noting as the threat to lawful order, “Carl Schmitt’s sovereign, ‘he who 
decides on the exception,’ decides when to step outside the law”). Schmitt remains an 
important, if controversial, figure in legal discourse. See, e.g., Robert Knowles, National 
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operating in an environment of failing municipal and transnational 
governance structures has provided an example in which lawlessness 
has so eviscerated the social fabric of the Syrian community as to 
destroy the necessary basis for legal authority and as to require the re-
establishment of legal order wholesale. True lawlessness exists and, 
as a matter of definition, cannot be lawfully combatted.24 Law in a 
lawless space ceases to be meaningful;25 adherence to it runs the risk 
of misunderstanding the problem and proposing the kinds of solutions 
that further exacerbate it.26  
But, as the Article concludes, not all is lost for law. Lawlessness 
points out the “end” of law in both its descriptive and normative 
meaning of terminus and purpose respectively. Descriptively, 
lawlessness points out the conceptual limit of law and how social 
processes are pushed beyond it.27 Here the Article rejects Professor 
Reisman’s invocation of law as a meaningful yet realistic guide for 
decision-making.28 As a descriptive matter, the choice between means 
                                                                                                                                     
Security Rulemaking, 41 FLA. ST. L. REV. 883, 890-91 (2014) (noting that “Schmitt's 
perspective . . . has dominated national security law scholarship at least since September 11, 
2001”); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Political Theology with a Difference, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
407, 413-14 (2014) (proposing a reconciliation of Schmittian political theology with liberal 
political theory); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
1095, 1098-1101 (2009) (discussing Schmittian account of exceptions in the context of 
administrative law). 
24. See CARL SCHMITT, POLITISCHE THEOLOGIE 19-20 (Duncker & Humblot eds., 2004) 
(“Every general norm demands normal living conditions that form the factual predicate to 
which it is to be applied and which are in turn subjected to its normative rule. Norm needs a 
homogeneous medium. This factual normalcy is not just an ‘external condition’ that a jurist 
could ignore; quite to the contrary, it is part of its immanent validity. There is no norm that 
could be applied to chaos. Order must be established for rule of law to make sense.”) (author’s 
translation).  
25. See id. 
26. See Gertrude Leighton, The Legal Community of Mankind: A Critical Analysis of the 
Modern Concept of World Organization, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1114, 1117-18 (1955) (book 
review) (noting the inherent relation between international legal norm creation and application 
and the social processes in which they are embedded). 
27. Unlike the classic discussion between positivists like Raz and constructivists like 
Dworkin about the limits of law, the point is not so much to distinguish between legal and 
social rules. Rather, the point is that legal decision-making reaches its terminus (even in a 
Dworkinian conception) when the social fabric itself disintegrates. See Joseph Raz, Legal 
Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 842-53 (1972) (laying out the positivist 
position that law has limits); Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 
passim (1967) (providing the counterpoint to Raz’s argument). On the continued importance of 
the Raz-Dworkin argument, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure 
and Value in the Common Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241, 1254-55 (2015). 
28. See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 21. 
2015] THE END OF LAW 363 
to address this crisis cannot be discerned by references to legal rules 
or decision-making processes.29 
But normatively, lawlessness reveals that the “end” or purpose 
of law is precisely to root out such states of crisis and re-establish 
social processes that are once again authoritatively governable. 
Lawlessness from this vantage point is not a black hole in the sense of 
dispensing with the values of the rule of law in formulating policy 
prescriptions, as some have argued.30 Quite to the contrary, any such 
view would risk extenuating the corrosive effect of lawlessness and 
swallow more and more weight-bearing elements of authoritative 
decision-making, i.e., law, as such.31 The Article thus submits that 
Professor Reisman’s analysis is normatively apt—law strives for a 
world in which lawful decision can always be contextually 
meaningful yet realistic.32 Not yielding to this normative demand 
degrades the authority of law, and, over time, its ability to constrain, 
at all.33 This Article goes on to make a contribution by developing a 
coherent theory of how this corrosive effect of lawlessness operates 
beginning on the municipal stage and, through transnational 
transference, ending on the international plane. 
Using this theory, the Article concludes that the key to 
developing a policy response to ISIL lies in addressing the cause of 
lawlessness in Syria and Iraq, namely the severe and ongoing 
deterioration of social structures lending authority to legal decision. 
No matter the coercive choices made, it is this authority gap that 
imperatively must be closed to stem the contagion of lawlessness in 
the region and to protect U.S. and Western national security interests. 
This authority gap must first and foremost address the growing 
                                                            
29. See id. 
30. See Vermeule, supra note 23, at 1149 (arguing that thick rule of law values must 
cede before the exception).  
31. See SCHMITT, supra note 24, at 19 (“The exception reveals the essence of state 
authority with greatest clarity. It separates decision from the legal norm; and (to formulate in 
the form of a paradox) authority proves that to create rights, it does not have to be in the 
right.”) (author’s translation) (translator’s note – the German word is “Recht” which refers 
both to “law” as in the legal order and rights. The word “rights” is chosen to maintain the 
linguistic aporia intended by Schmitt). The point thus is that the exception always seeks to 
create rights/ law rather than further eviscerate them. See id. (“Autorität … um Recht zu 
schaffen”/ “authority … in order to create law” designates a teleology of authority as by 
definition jurisgenerative). If the reaction to the exception fails to do so, it simply fails to be 
authoritative by Schmitt’s construct of authority. See id.  
32. See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 21. 
33. See id. at 213-16. 
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displacement of refugees from the area and their continued 
participation in decisions about their homeland. Any other response 
will lead to the emergence of renewed and more severe forms of 
lawlessness from a region already left in a state of social decay and 
developmental jeopardy.34 
This Article has five parts. Part I sets out and adopts the basic 
premises of the jurisprudential perspective championed by Professor 
Reisman and sketches his argument that legal solutions can always be 
fashioned in a meaningful and realistic manner.35 Part II discusses the 
development of ISIL in the Middle East. Part III analyzes the 
lawlessness problem created by ISIL for the affected local 
communities and explains how loss of control, left unattended, 
transforms into a loss of authority of prescription by destroying the 
social fabric needed for legal processes to have meaning. Part IV 
develops how municipal lawlessness has a contagion effect on the 
international plane through what this Article calls the transnational 
transference of lawlessness by comparing international legal reactions 
to ISIL’s putative establishment of a caliphate in Syria and Iraq.36 Part 
V sketches how the contagion effect can be stopped by means of the 
diagnostic tools developed in Parts III and IV.  
The Article demonstrates that both public debate and scholarly 
engagement so far have focused on the wrong question: whether or 
how to use force to wrest control of territory from ISIL.37 Given the 
progression of lawlessness from loss of control to loss of authority 
mapped in Part III of the Article, this incorrect focus is 
understandable. But to be effective, the debate instead must focus 
directly on how authoritative decision-making processes can be 
rekindled and protected in Syria, Iraq, and beyond. These structures 
were degraded not just by ISIL, which may well be a symptom of 
failing authority structures rather than its proximate cause;38 in fact, 
                                                            
34. See Josh Feng, How Successful Were the Millennium Development Goals? A Final 
Report, NEW SECURITY BEAT (July 28, 2015), http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2015/07/
successful-millennium-development-goals-final-report/ (“Conflict and displacement is taking a 
toll as well. While hunger has fallen in most areas, projections indicate that the prevalence of 
undernourishment in the Middle East will rise by 32 percent between 2014 and 2016 due to 
war, civil unrest, and increasing numbers of refugees.”). 
35. REISMAN, supra note 14, at 21. 
36. See infra Section IV.A. 
37. See supra note 16. 
38. See Press Release, John McCain, Senator, Statement on President Obama’s Proposed 
AUMF (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/2/statement-by-
senator-john-mccain-on-president-obama-s-proposed-aumf (demanding “a more coherent, 
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these structures were sabotaged by Western and Ottoman colonial 
powers long before ISIL sought its opportunity on Arabian soil.39 
Perhaps counter-intuitively, use of force that does not also address 
and re-strengthen the social fabric in the region could well be worse 
long-term than no use of force at all. Given the human toll in the 
region—and the role as other than an innocent bystander of Western 
powers—the normative end of law should inspire us towards more 
effective—and more authoritative—forms of intervention.  
I. DECODING LEGAL DECISION—THE NEW HAVEN APPROACH 
The New Haven School of International Law (the “School”) is 
one of the most influential legal theories in international legal 
discourse.40 It is also one of the most misunderstood.41 This potential 
for misunderstanding is regrettable from a theoretical point of view; 
the School is a direct relation of two of the most important American 
legal theories, American legal realism and pragmatism.42 The School, 
founded by Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, is closely related 
to notable figures in American jurisprudence such as Karl Llewellyn 
of UCC Article 2 fame, or, more distantly, Justices Oliver Wendell 
Holmes and Benjamin N. Cardozo.43 More pragmatically, the School 
                                                                                                                                     
comprehensive strategy, and a recognition that ISIL is a symptom of the disease spawned by 
Bashar Assad’s war on the Syrian people”). 
39. See Tarek Osman, Why Border Lines Drawn with a Ruler in WW1 Still Rock the 
Middle East, BBC (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553 
(explaining the effect of colonial French and British ambition on current Middle East 
conflicts). 
40. See Anne Peters, Realizing Utopias as a Scholarly Endeavour, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
533, 541 (2013) (noting that the School is one of the two “most influential academic schools of 
our time”). 
41. See Richard Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law, 
104 YALE L.J. 1991, 2001 (1995) (noting the common perception that the New Haven 
School’s prescriptions would simply coincide with State Department needs). 
42. See Harold Hongju Koh, Michael Reisman, Dean of the New Haven School of 
International Law, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 501, 501-02 (2009) (noting the legal realist origin of 
the school); Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American 
Legal Thought – A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and 
Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861, 862 (1981) (noting the importance of pragmatism and legal 
realism). 
43. Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation, 109 
PENN ST. L. REV. 397, 446 (2004) (“Realism owes its name to Llewellyn's 1930 article A 
Realistic Jurisprudence.”); John C.P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 
1451-52 (1999) (reviewing ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998)) (noting the relationship 
between Holmes, Cardozo and legal realism); 1 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. 
MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY, STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 
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is the best-developed international legal theory advocating a 
capabilities approach to human development—an approach adopted 
in economics and political theory convincingly to point out the 
myopia of formalist measures of macroeconomic development and 
decline.44 The School thus assists in designing legal strategies to 
foster such development.  
This Part first lays out the analytical framework of the School, 
which the Article adopts.45 It second develops the argument against 
lawlessness proposed by the School’s most important current 
champion, Professor Michael Reisman.46 Parts III to V explain why 
this proposal is the only means to address the flaws in current legal 
responses to the Syrian crisis. But as also discussed in Parts III to V, 
the Syrian conflict causes the central assumption of even his 
capacious proposal to fail; there is thus no escaping lawlessness.  
A. The Framework of Legal Decision 
1. Law as a Communicative Process 
As a jurisprudence deeply indebted to legal realism, the School 
is directed against legal formalism.47 It rejects that legal rules could 
be divined, derived, or applied in a vacuum.48 The School instead 
understands law as a particular form of process of decision.49 The 
idea, simply, is that law is a means of communication.50 This 
communication must be understood within the larger social context of 
which it forms a part.51 Because this social context and the legal 
perspective interpenetrate each other, statements about law must take 
                                                                                                                                     
13-14 (1992) (associating the key tenets of the School with Justice Holmes, Judge Jerome 
Frank, and legal realism). 
44. Compare LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 171-77 (specifying the 
different features of each particular value process to be protected in global public order), and 
REISMAN, supra note 14, at 360 (same), with MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING 
CAPABILITIES, THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 33-34 (2011) (specifying ten central 
capabilities at the heart of the capabilities approach). 
45. See infra Section I.A. 
46. See infra Section I.B. 
47. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 249 (“An important preliminary 
contribution, in which most proponents of the frame joined, was in demythologizing the 
positivist paradigm, and in demonstrating that logical derivation, when taken alone, is a most 
inadequate instrument for the clarification of policy.”). 
48. See id. 
49. See id. at 119.  
50. REISMAN, supra note 14, at 135. 
51. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 30. 
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a functional perspective—law does not have a separate and 
distinguishable substance from non-law, only a different function 
within the broader array of social processes.52 Derisively, opponents 
of legal realism have submitted that legal decisions are made not by 
reference to black letter law, but what the judge ate for breakfast.53 Of 
course, less derisively, US jurisprudence has long accepted with the 
near canonization of Ronald Dworkin, a thinker with an ambivalent 
relationship to legal realism, that social context is inextricably 
intertwined with legal interpretation and application.54 It is such a less 
radical claim to which the School subscribes.55 
The focus upon social processes naturally entail the inclusion of 
a wide array of inconsistent values of the various groups and 
individuals in society that law must somehow manage to 
accommodate.56 The School is clear about the fact that no single 
denominator can be found by which law could harmonize these 
                                                            
52. See id. at 22-25. 
53. Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making, 
75 B.U. L. REV. 941, 944 (1995) (“The polar case for such individual-oriented descriptions of 
judicial decision-making is extreme legal realism, which supposes that judges' decisions 
depend on a large number of factors – including what the judge ate for breakfast on the 
morning of a decision – so numerous and relating to outcomes in so complex a manner as to 
obscure the actual basis for decision.”). This is a caricature of legal realism—and that one that 
most sophisticated adherents to the school reject. Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, 
Empiricism, Experimentalism, and Conditional Theory, 67 SMU L. REV. 141, 145 (2014). 
54. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A GLOBAL 
CONTEXT 72 (2005) (noting Dworkin’s role as an influential adversary of legal realism). 
Compare Tom Lininger, On Dworkin and Borkin’, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1315, 1317 n.8 (2007) 
(“An empirical study has shown that Dworkin is the most influential scholar in legal 
philosophy today.”), with RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225 (1986) (“The adjudicative 
principle of integrity instructs judges to identify legal rights and duties, so far as possible, on 
the assumption that they were all created by a single author – the community personified – 
expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness.”). Whether one views Dworkin as an 
adversary of realism or a continuation of its insights, Dworkin has showcased that social 
context and legal decision cannot meaningfully be separated. 
55. The School has significant points of disagreement with Dworkin. LASSWELL & 
MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 242. They agree, however, on important elements of the frame 
how social processes and legal processes relate to one another. Michael Reisman, A 
Jurisprudence from the Perspective of the “Political Superior,” 23 N. KY. L. REV. 605, 625 
(1996) (“The responsible applier must be careful to avoid the nihilism of deconstructive 
theories, the irresponsibility of theories that purport to liberate appliers from all social controls, 
and the sterility (from this perspective) of a jurisprudence of strict obedience. Metaphors such 
as Dworkin's ‘chain novel’ may express the spirit of the activity, but do not supply policy 
guidelines for its execution.”). On an articulation of disagreement with some forms of realism 
from Dworkin’s side, see Dworkin, supra note 27, at 15-17, 23. 
56. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 13; REISMAN, supra note 14, at 
181, 185. 
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different values.57 There is no logical derivation of the correct 
answer.58 Instead, law becomes a tool for conflict resolution made 
famous in Getting to Yes in that it seeks to find mutual gain by 
balancing shared interests, dovetailing differing interests, and 
sustainable apportionment of (joint) losses.59 Again, this frame is 
sometimes derided by some as requiring the comparison of whether a 
rock is heavier than a line is long.60 But again, US jurisprudence has 
incorporated it in the most common place of judicial tools: the 
balancing test.61  
The School relevantly proposes that there are two modes of 
participation in legal communication. The first is the textual-rule-
based mode.62 This mode is the most familiar and communicates 
simply about how we read and apply law, typically in the context of 
legal dispute or litigation.63 This mode at first blush looks like an 
adoption of a formalist or quasi-formalist frame.64 It varies from it by 
insisting that the gathering of facts deemed relevant for determination 
of the dispute, the demarcation and interpretation of legal rules 
deemed triggered by these facts, and the final application of the law 
so determined to the facts so gathered is heavily dependent upon the 
broader social context in which the dispute takes place and to which it 
makes reference.65 One might surmise that the recent marriage 
equality decision is an example of just such an application of the 
textual-rule-based mode.66 
                                                            
57. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 13; REISMAN, supra note 14, at 
181, 185. 
58. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 249. 
59. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 72-77 (Bruce Patton ed., 3d 
ed. 2011). 
60. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
61. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
779, 856-59 (1994). 
62. See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 177-83. 
63. See id. at 176. 
64. See id. at 177 (“Some scholars liken the application function in legal arrangements to 
the decisions of a referee or umpire in a sports match.”). 
65. See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 177-78. 
66. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (“It would misunderstand 
these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do 
respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is 
not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization's oldest 
institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them 
that right.”); accord W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, The New 
Haven School: A Brief Introduction, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 575, 576 (2007) (“A public order of 
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The School further proposes a context-policy-based mode.67 This 
mode is less familiar.68 It communicates about how the law should be 
developed,69 typically though certainly not exclusively in the context 
of legislation or codification of the law (such as in the context of 
multilateral treaty drafters or the International Law Commission’s 
work systematically to gather and develop international law),70 
appraisal of the functioning of existing legal rules to determine 
whether these rules should be terminated or modified (such as in the 
context of current debates relating to investor-state dispute 
settlement),71 or, in some instances, in the execution of broad 
mandates such as the U.N. Security Council’s function to safeguard 
international peace and security.72 This mode seeks to determine first 
the ultimate goals the legal order aspires to follow in a given 
situation,73 establish trends towards or away from those goals,74 
deduce which factors were most relevant in past decisions involving 
the same goals,75 establish the cost of doing nothing,76 devises 
creative alternatives that minimizes as much as possible unwanted 
consequences of potential actions and maximizes the goals in 
question.77 In short, this mode turns on deeply prudential concerns 
rather than principally interpretive concerns.78 
2. Authority and Control  
The core elements of the process of legal decision or 
communication in both modes of principled decision-making are 
                                                                                                                                     
human dignity is defined as one which approximates the optimum access by all human beings 
to all things they cherish: power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, well-being, affection, respect, 
and rectitude. This, in a nutshell, characterizes the contribution the New Haven School has 
made to the law's academic and policy enterprise.”). 
67. See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 183-90. 
68. See id. at 173. 
69. See id. at 170-71. 
70. See id. at 173. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. at 201. 
73. Id. at 185. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 186. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. See Joshua P. Davis, Legality, Morality, Duality, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 55, 92 (2014) 
(discussing the role of prudential concerns while employing a similar dualist frame of 
reference to modes of legal decision-making). 
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control and authority.79 Both are empirically observable features of 
the social process.80 Control refers to the “effective participation in 
the making and enforcing of decision; choice in outcome must be 
realized in significant degree in practice.”81 It relates to “operations,” 
which are ultimately a question of power, or, more precisely, the 
application of power.82  
Authority refers to the level of predictability or anticipation of 
uses of power, or control operations, in society.83 The School defines 
authority as “participation in decision in accordance with community 
perspectives about who is to make what decisions, by what criteria, 
and by what procedures; the reference is empirical, to a certain 
frequency in the perspectives of people who constitute a given 
community.”84 Authority thus makes relevant “perspectives.”85 These 
perspectives refer to community “expectations about both authority 
and control, and inquiry will be made about both patterns of authority 
and patterns of control in fact.”86  
Authority, thus, does not refer to abstract moral or metaphysical 
principles of right and wrong. Instead, authority answers the down-to-
earth question of whether, for instance, a police officer has the 
“authority” to exit a car and forcibly throw the driver to the ground 
for failing extinguish a cigarette and “back-talking,” having stopped 
the driver for failure to indicate a turn;87 do we as a society consider 
                                                            
79.  The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction, supra note 66, at 576 (“The New 
Haven School defines law as a process of decision that is both authoritative and controlling.”). 
80. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 26. 
81. Id.  
82. Myres S. McDougal, Legal Bases for Securing the Integrity of the Earth-Space 
Environment, 8 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 177, 182 (1992) (“[B]ehavioristic operations, 
the choices in fact made and enforced by threats of severe deprivations or promises of extreme 
indulgences.”) 
83. LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 26. 
84. Id. 
85. See id. 
86. Id. at 24. 
87. See Holly Yan et al., Sandra Bland’s Family ‘Infuriated’ at Video of Her Arrest, 
CNN (July 23, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/22/us/texas-sandra-bland-arrest/.  
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this aberrant behavior88—whether or not, on some interpretation of 
law, the officer is broadly empowered to do so.89 
Decision without control lacks legal quality because it is simply 
pretense.90 It has no means of finding application to the real world.91 
It is the ultimate form of wishful thinking.92 This form of wishful 
thinking might over time of course alter the reality which it describes 
if it is sufficiently prevalent.93 In such instances, it simply 
reconstructs normative communication until even the actors with 
control themselves recoil from exercising power in a certain way.94 
Such instances are exceedingly rare. 
On the other hand, decisions which lack authority are simply 
premised in naked power.95 They are not accepted or integrated into 
the social matrix of reciprocal decision-making that make up our day-
to-day lives in as much as they do not become part of the perspectives 
or expectations of how control will be exercised in the relevant 
society.96 By lacking authority, these decisions are ultimately not 
predictable.97 By being unpredictable it is further not possible to 
provide them with any form of normative superstructure that might 
explain or justify the use of power to make effective a decision by 
means of a control apparatus.98 The assertion of control without 
                                                            
88. Interestingly, in the case of Sandra Bland, the most firebrand presidential contender 
for the Republican Party, Donald Trump, addressed the incident through precisely this lens. 
Janell Ross, Donald Trump’s Intriguing Comments about Sandra Bland. Yes, Really, WASH. 
POST, July 23, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2015/07/23/donald-
trumps-intriguing-comments-about-sandra-bland-yes-really/. 
89. See Richard Winton, Can a Police Officer Order You Out of Your Car? Experts 
Weigh in on Sandra Bland Case, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/nation/
la-na-sandra-bland-arrest-experts-20150722-story.html (“He certainly has the legal authority to 
get her to step out of the car,” Stoughton said. “But in this case, if he is exercising his authority 
because she [is] defying his direction to put out the cigarette, then that is more based on his 
ego than public safety. Just because it is legal to order her out of the car doesn't make it a 
professional approach in modern policing.”). 
90. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 26. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. 
93. See Myres McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function in World 
Constitutive Process: How International Law Is Made, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 250, 
251 (1980) (“In certain marginal situations, authority may constitute the sole base value for a 
particular process of prescription.”). 
94. See id.; see also FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS passim 
(Walter Kaufmann trans., 1989).  
95. LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 26. 
96. See id. at 24. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. 
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authority is the breaking down of social discourse until its ultimate 
dissolution.99  
3. Constitutive and Public Order Processes 
The New Haven School is express that it views authoritative 
decision as part of an iterative social process. Thus, 
Law will be regarded not merely as rules or as isolated decision, 
but as a continuous process of authoritative decision, including 
both the constitutive and public order decisions by which a 
community’s policies are made and remade. The processes of 
authoritative decision in any particular community will be seen 
as an integral part, in an endless sequence of causes and effects, 
of the whole social process of that community. Every particular 
community will, finally, be observed to affect, and be affected 
by, a whole complex of parallel and concentric, interpenetrating 
communities, from local through regional to global.100 
 In this process, pride of place is given to constitutive process as 
opposed to public order processes. These are each defined in turn as 
follows: 
the ‘constitutive process’ of a community may be described as 
the decisions which identify and characterize the different 
authoritative decision makers, specify and clarify basic 
community policies, establish appropriate structures of authority, 
allocate bases of power for sanctioning purposes, authorize 
procedures for making the different kinds of decisions, and 
secure the continuous performance of all the different kinds of 
decision functions . . . necessary to making and administering 
general community policy.101  
In turn, “basic community policies” refer to “basic values that ought 
to inform the more general community” as determined by the relevant 
perspectives.102 In contrast, “the ‘public order’ decisions of a 
community may be described as those, emerging in continuous flow 
                                                            
99. See JACQUES DERRIDA, DE LA GRAMMATOLOGIE 18 (1967). 
100. LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, 24-25. 
101. Id. at 28. 
102. Winston P. Nagan, Economic Sanctions, U.S. Foreign Policy, International Law 
and the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 4 FLA. INT’L L.J. 85, 97 (1988); see Winston P. Nagan & 
Joshua L. Root, The Emerging Restrictions on Sovereign Immunity: Peremptory Norms of 
International Law, the U.N. Charter, and the Application of Modern Communications Theory, 
38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 375, 386 (2013) (explaining the relationship between 
perspectives and basic community policies in the New Haven School).  
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from the constitutive process, which shape and maintain the protected 
features of the community’s various value processes.”103 
B. Professor Reisman’s Lawlessness Argument 
Professor Reisman submits that within such an authoritative 
process of decision making conceived by reference to the pillars laid 
out in Part I.A, the law never runs out.104 He explains the appearance 
of lawlessness by reference to four types of constitutive 
configurations: (1) constitutive processes without hierarchical 
institutions, (2) constitutive processes with manifestly ineffective 
hierarchical institutions, (3) constitutive processes with partly 
effective hierarchical institutions, and (4) constitutive processes with 
highly effective hierarchical institutions.105 A constitutive process 
relying solely upon ineffective hierarchical institutions relies entirely 
upon unilateral action determined by the law of the strongest.106 A 
constitutive process relying upon ineffective hierarchical structures 
relies upon operational codes of a shadow process behind the myth 
system of an officially-sanctioned constitutive process; in short, the 
greater this gulf, the closer we are to confirming the conspiracy 
theorist’s warning that functions of government are carried out by 
figures unauthorized to carry them out and no formal authority to stop 
them.107 A constitutive process with partly effective hierarchical 
institutions is built around a system of apparent complete hierarchy—
but permits a number of exceptions in which a principal means of 
vindication of rights is unilateral action such as, for instance, the right 
of self-defense.108 A completely effective hierarchical system 
displaces even these spheres of unilateral empowerment.109  
Lawlessness appears problematic in only two of the four 
configurations, which Professor Reisman calls offshore zones—
constitutive processes with manifestly ineffective hierarchical 
institutions and constitutive processes with partly effective 
hierarchical institutions.110 Lawlessness—or wanton unilateral 
                                                            
103. LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 28. 
104. See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 21. 
105. Id. at 117. 
106. See id. at 118. 
107. See id. at 118-19. 
108. See id. at 121. 
109. See id. at 122-23. 
110. See id. at 20, 123. 
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action—is not a problem in the first configuration lacking hierarchical 
institutions because unilateral action is all there is; law is defined by 
strength and all participants in such a social process, hypothetically, 
expect as much.111 In the fourth configuration, lawlessness has no 
chance to arise as unilateral action is simply unlawful and will be 
swiftly treated as such.112 Where the problem does arise, Professor 
Reisman diagnoses that “the uncertainty with regard to the lawfulness 
of unilateral action or its normative ambiguity arises from the 
cognitive dissonance caused by the realization that the constitutive 
process to which the prerogatives of action has been assigned is either 
generally or momentarily unable to implement rights which it is 
supposed to have guaranteed. . . .”113 
The lawlessness problem in the second and third configurations 
is ultimately resolved by reference to the policy-context-based mode 
of decision to justify or condemn unilateral action.114 Where there is 
no hierarchical institution that would prescribe certain conduct that 
could be applied in a textual-rule-based mode of decision-making, the 
question is one of making new rules for the case and further develop 
the normative fabric for future decisions.115 As goals can always be 
extrapolated and strategies developed to make effective those goals, 
law can self-propel itself out of any morass.116 Just like a language, it 
incorporates and adapts with blinding speed to new social phenomena 
precisely because law as a social process is inextricably intertwined in 
the process of creating these new social realities.117 This, of course, 
will lead to a certain amount of indeterminacy (the enterprise is 
creative and balancing multiple alternative values at the same time – 
permitting reasonable minds to differ and differ violently as to the 
appropriate strategy to adopt).118 But this indeterminacy is accounted 
                                                            
111. See id. at 118, 123. 
112. Id. at 123. 
113. Id. 
114. See id. at 190-91 (“As general matter, when controlling practice is distinct from the 
institutions of formal authority, as is often the case in the offshore zones, functional analysis is 
required. The international lawyer, operating in the policy-context-based mode, needs a more 
explicit conceptual technique for mapping the relevant processes, the most critical of which 
may not conform to the myth system.”). 
115. See id. at 170, 190-91. 
116. See id. at 188 (“These intellectual constructs of alternative futures serve to indicate 
what steps should be taken to increase the probability of the eventuation of a preferred future 
while minimizing the likelihood of the eventuation of the dystopias.”). 
117. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations ¶ 18, in 1 LUDWIG 
WITTGENSTEIN, WERKAUSGABE 225, 245 (Joachim Schulte ed., 1997). 
118. See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 188. 
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for within the capacious confines of law (and its policy-context-based 
mode).119 
Given the ultimate commitment to the deeply constitutive value 
of human dignity, there is much to commend this approach.120 It 
keeps law (and lawyers) engaged in international crisis de-
escalation.121 It provides a language, or appropriately a structure, 
forum, or grammar, in which to collaborate across frontlines towards 
a common solution.122 And it creates a meaningful and meaning-
generating buffer to rash and perhaps irremediable unilateral action 
by one of the members of the international community thinking itself 
at liberty to act with impunity by the sheer absence of law to stop it.123 
As the remainder of this Article will discuss, as strong and desirable 
as this conception is, it has an Achilles heel: it operates only as long 
as there is a robust web of social processes to support it.124 As the 
ISIL crisis showcases, this web of social processes is far more fragile 
than one might hope—with potentially catastrophic consequences. 
II. THE ISIL PROBLEM 
ISIL is a loose military and quasi-political network organized 
around an extreme form of Wahhabi dogma.125 The group originally 
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120. See The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction, supra note 66, at 576. 
121. See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 477. 
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Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633, 680 (1962). 
123. See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 21. 
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a world of such total instability. REISMAN, supra note 14, at 118. One can seriously call such 
an assumption into question. And if the effective use of naked power erodes both authority and 
the social fabric, it is simply not true on the terms of The Quest for World Order and Human 
Dignity in the Twenty-first Century that authoritative decisions can be furnished for any 
situation. See id. at 21. 
125. See David D. Kirkpatrick, ISIS’ Harsh Brand of Islam Is Rooted in Austere Saudi 
Creed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/world/middleeast/
isis-abu-bakr-baghdadi-caliph-wahhabi.html (“For their guiding principles, the leaders of the 
Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, are open and clear about their almost exclusive 
commitment to the Wahhabi movement of Sunni Islam.”); Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really 
Wants, ATLANTIC, March 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-
isis-really-wants/384980/. For a discussion of the critical reception of Wood’s Atlantic article 
in Islamic studies circles, see Jack Jenkins, What the Atlantic Gets Dangerously Wrong About 
ISIS and Islam, THINK PROGRESS (Feb. 18, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/02/18/
3624121/atlantic-gets-dangerously-wrong-isis-islam/. 
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formed in April 2004 as an al-Qaida affiliate to attack United States 
and coalition forces in Iraq.126 The group was founded by Abu 
Mus’ab al-Zarqawi.127 Mr. al-Zarqawi was not himself an Iraqi 
national.128 Membership in his group similarly drew on significant 
international membership.129 This raised issues of identity and 
purpose of the group at a relatively early stage.130 The original goal of 
the group was to pressure the United States and its allies to leave 
Iraq.131 Al-Zarqawi ultimately led one of the most deadly and brutal 
terrorists groups in Iraq.132 Al-Zarqawi was killed by a US airstrike 
north of Baghdad in June 2006.133 
 Following al-Zarqawi’s death, the group eventually came to be 
led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.134 Al-Baghdadi, born Ibrahim Awwad 
Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, is an Iraqi national.135 He was 
initially deemed comparatively insignificant—reports tell of his 
detention in 2005 and release by US forces in 2009.136 Al-Baghdadi 
rose to a leadership position in April 2010 following the deaths of the 
                                                            
126. NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), http://www.
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130. See Al-Zarqawi’s Successor Chosen, MILITARY.COM (June 12, 2006), 
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,100732,00.html (noting that “there were 
tensions between homegrown Iraqi insurgents and the Jordanian-born al-Zarqawi over 
strategy, and U.S. and Iraqi officials sought to fuel the differences by painting al-Zarqawi as a 
foreign killing Iraqis for his own purposes”). 
131. See Al-Qa’ida in Iraq, supra note 126. 
132. See generally Laura Smith, Timeline: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, GUARDIAN, June 8, 
2006, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jun/08/iraq.alqaida1 (detailing the killings 
attributed to al-Zarqawi’s group). 
133. See John F. Burns, U.S. Strike Hits Insurgent at Safehouse, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/world/middleeast/08cnd-iraq.html.  
134. See Janine Di Giovanni, Who Is ISIS Leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi?, NEWSWEEK, 
Dec. 8, 2014, http://www.newsweek.com/2014/12/19/who-isis-leader-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-
290081.html.  
135. See id. 
136. See Ruth Sherlock, How a Talented Footballer Became World’s Most Wanted Man, 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, TELEGRAPH, Nov. 11, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10948846/How-a-talented-footballer-became-worlds-most-wanted-
man-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi.html.  
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group’s previous leaders.137 At this time, the group’s strategy became 
increasingly more violent, launching what a U.N. Security Council 
committee called “a wave of AQI/ISI suicide attacks [which] began in 
Mosul, Iraq, [and] which culminated in over 70 deaths.” Further, the 
group “pledged to carry out 100 attacks across Iraq in retaliation for 
Bin Laden’s death.”138  
ISIL rose to prominence outside of Iraq particularly in the 
context of the Syrian Civil War.139 This civil war began as an 
outgrowth of the larger Arab Spring movement.140 In contrast to the 
results of the Arab Spring movement in some other countries, Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad did not ultimately relinquish power but 
instead began a military campaign against the movement to remove 
him from office.141 The use of military force by Syria led to the 
formation of a large variety of insurgent military groups fighting the 
Syrian government.142 
                                                            
137. See U.N. Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Narrative Summary of 
Reasons for Listing Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali Al-Badi Al Samarrai (June 3, 2014), 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/ 
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Levant, or ISIL) as an expression of its broadened ambitions as its fighters have crossed into 
neighboring Syria to challenge both the Assad regime and secular and Islamist opposition 
groups there.”). 
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The conflict in Syria led to a significant number of killed and 
displaced Syrian citizens and residents.143 Killings were targeted to 
decapitate the insurgent movements or loyalist strongholds on the 
ground.144 Killings by Syrian forces in particular also could be 
indiscriminate—using chemical weapons or other munitions intended 
to maximize damage to as a large group of the population as 
possible.145 
ISIL entered the Syrian theater in 2011.146 Al-Baghdadi 
instructed Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani to establish a Syrian 
presence.147 ISIL stepped into the conflict and fast became one of the 
more successful groups in the region, fighting back Syrian forces and 
holding territory in Syria proper.148 Following upon its successes in 
Syria, ISIL also continued its efforts in Iraq.149 ISIL secured defeats 
of the Iraqi army in the north and west of Iraq.150 At one point, ISIL 
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2015) (placing the current number of dead as a result of the Syrian civil war at 220,000 and 
recounting the displacement occurring as a result of the conflict). 
144. See Sylvia Westall, Syrian Military on Offensive as Conflict Enters Fifth Year, 
REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/15/us-mideast-crisis-syria-
south-idUSKBN0MB0BI20150315 (providing a current snapshot of the fighting). 
145. See Rick Gladstone, Militants Add Cluster Bombing to Tactics, Rights Group Says, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/02/world/middleeast/militants-
add-cluster-bombing-to-tactics-rights-group-says.html (reporting use of “cluster bombs, the 
banned weapons that kill and maim indiscriminately” by ISIL); Rick Gladstone, Heavy Use of 
Banned Cluster Bombs Reported in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/monitor-reports-heavy-cluster-bomb-use-in-syria.html 
(reporting on significant use of cluster munitions by the Syrian government); Lisa Lambert, 
U.S. ‘Deeply Disturbed’ by Reports of Chemical Weapons in Syria: Kerry, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 
2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/19/us-syria-crisis-kerry-idUSKBN0MF20Q2
0150319 (noting renewed allegations of use of chemical weapons by Syrian forces following a 
2013 agreement by Syria to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile). 
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advanced close to the Iraqi capital, Baghdad.151 As ISIL moved 
through Iraq, it similarly sought to control territory in its own right.152 
ISIL’s rule over the territories it held is particularly brutal.153 
ISIL has been implicated in genocide, mass murder, the slave trade, 
and torture.154 The atrocities committed by ISIL make clear the 
extreme predicament in which those subject to its rule find 
themselves.155 The acts of ISIL do not follow any standard of legality 
and appear to be the very opposite of acts in compliance with the rule 
of law given their arbitrary and barbaric nature—in many instances 
subjecting even children to unspeakable cruelty.156 As detailed further 
in this Article, these atrocities have led to a mass exodus under 
unspeakable conditions of the populations threatened by ISIL.  
At the same time, it is similarly clear that there is no readily 
effective means to counter ISIL in place. ISIL has successfully 
rebuffed the traditional government forces of both Iraq and Syria.157 It 
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is thus not subject to easy ouster from the territory it holds.158 Any 
such action when successful requires significant foreign military aid 
and assistance from the United States and—according to reports—
Iran.159 Moreover, at this point additional actors have entered the 
scene in addressing the chaos in the region, with Russia and Iran 
sending forces and China contemplating to do the same.160 
ISIL’s strategic use of violence particularly against fellow 
Muslims caused al-Qaida to sever ties with ISIL.161 This severing of 
ties is not a matter of political convenience but represents a 
significant dogmatic difference on how al-Qaida and ISIL view the 
role of violence. The extreme Wahhabi dogma to which ISIL 
subscribes views violence as “an end in itself” rather than a means to 
the end of ejecting unbelievers from Islamic countries—and most 
importantly the Middle East.162 In other words, ISIL is more 
reactionary in theological and political outlook than al-Qaida to the 
point of creating irreconcilable dogmatic differences with its prior 
umbrella organization.  
III. LAWLESSNESS ON THE GROUND 
The particular circumstances surrounding the rise of ISIL 
showcase trenchantly how lawlessness evolves and deepens from a 
pragmatic to a functional problem. As explained below, this evolution 
begins with a temporal loss of control towards a full loss of structures 
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capable of supporting authoritative decisions. This Part shows the key 
features of each stage of lawlessness and how it can quickly develop 
from one stage to the next.  
A. The Pragmatic Problem 
The first form in which lawlessness can manifest itself is 
pragmatic lawlessness. There is “rampant misbehavior.”163 Such 
rampant misbehavior occurs particularly if groups or individuals 
destroy or misappropriate property, or, in severe cases, do bodily 
harm or kill members of the local population.164 What distinguishes 
rampant misbehavior as a state of pragmatic lawlessness from the 
simple commission of a crime is its scope and duration.165 For a 
relevant period of time, the responsible authorities are not able to stop 
or curb the misbehavior in question.166 
Pragmatic lawlessness concerns simply the loss of control or 
power over a specific and important area for a short but significant 
period of time.167 The relevant authorities are deprived of the physical 
ability to regulate in the area.168 The authoritative expectation remains 
that the lawless actors will in fact be held to account of their actions 
for violations of the relevant local law.169 This expectation is typically 
backed by a long memory of similar prosecutions in the past.170 
Tracking the distinctions in Professor Reisman’s Quest for 
World Order and Human Dignity, pragmatic lawlessness exists 
because any legal system is to a point reliant upon only partly 
                                                            
163. Paul H. Robinson, Natural Law & Lawlessness: Modern Lessons from Pirates, 
Lepers, Eskimos, and Survivors, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 433, 436 (2013) (“The term 
‘lawlessness’ has two quite different meanings. It is used to refer to rampant misbehavior and 
also, less commonly, to situations in which there exists no governing legal system.”). 
164. For a discussion of examples see Susan S. Kuo, Bringing in the State: Toward a 
Constitutional Duty to Protect from Mob Violence, 79 IND. L.J. 177, 224 (2004). 
165. See id. 
166. See id. 
167. See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 105. 
168. In the sense that the state is no longer able to deliver (or control) minimum order in 
that area. See LASWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 153.  
169. See Stuart P. Green, Looting, Law, and Lawlessness, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1129, 1151 
(2007) (discussing the concept of looting in the law in post-Katrina New Orleans). 
170. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the 
Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1448-49 
(2004) (detailing the Court’s response to 1968 riots and critiquing the response as too focused 
on a law-and-order mentality). 
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effective hierarchical constitutive configurations.171 In other words, 
even in the most developed of legal systems, self-defense and defense 
of property are affirmative defenses to criminal prosecutions even for 
manslaughter or murder.172 Unilateral action is permitted because the 
state (thankfully) is not equipped with a “Precrime squad” capable of 
stopping each and every crime before it occurs.173  
For a time, the acts of ISIL exhibited typical signs of pragmatic 
lawlessness. Its actions could not be stopped by the relevant 
municipal authorities in either Syria or Iraq.174 This included both 
military forces of the respective governments, as well as other 
security forces that ordinarily would have responded to reports of a 
crime.175 It is further significant that ISIL’s actions are exceptionally 
brutal and further uniquely arbitrary.176 From the point of view of 
those suffering its rule, it is thus not always clear how they are to 
behave to avoid the most gruesome forms of torture, rape, 
enslavement, and execution.177 
B. The Formal Issue 
The pragmatic problem is not the only problem. The issue is not 
only that there is no de facto governmental authority that could stand 
up to ISIL’s lawlessness as of right now.178 ISIL provides a test case 
for a different form of lawlessness—one when there is no satisfying 
formal answer to re-establishment of lawful rule. In this case, the 
                                                            
171. See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 20 (“In practice, however, except for those systems 
which are completely totalitarian, legal reach is patchy.”). 
172. See generally Ray Taylor et al., Self-Defense in Homicide Cases, 42 AM. JURIS. 
TRIALS 151 (1991). 
173. See Minority Report Plot Synopsis, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0181689/ 
synopsis (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).  
174. See supra Part II. 
175. See supra Part II. 
176. See supra Part II. 
177. See Abuse ‘Rife in Secret Al-Qaeda Jails in Syria’,  supra note 153 (“Former 
detainees accused him of presiding over grotesquely unfair trials lasting no more than a few 
minutes, and of handing down death penalties which were subsequently carried out.”); Simon 
Tomlinson & Amy White, ‘This Is Our Football, It’s Made of Skin #World Cup:’ After 
Posting Sickening Beheading Video of Iraqi Policeman, ISIS Boast of Slaughtering 1,700 
Soldiers, DAILY MAIL (June 13, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2656905/ISIS-jihadists-seize-two-towns-bear-Baghdad-U-S-tanks-helicopters-stolen-fleeing-
western-trained-Iraqi-forces.html (describing videos posted by ISIL in which fighters 
indiscriminately machine gun motorists and pedestrians in conquered territories). 
178. See supra Section I.B. 
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actor who is formally supposed to return lawful rule to the territory in 
question is itself lawless.179 
The formal perspective thus does not look to the current state of 
affairs on the ground but rather looks to a hypothetical.180 If the 
current pragmatic lawlessness subsides, whose sovereignty is 
implicated?181 This sovereign’s laws remain formally applicable, 
meaning that the goal is simply to push back pragmatic lawlessness 
and return the area in question to the lawful rule of that formally 
applicable legal system—and do so with its consent.182  
In the context of the formal perspective of lawlessness, the issue 
at hand must be carefully drawn. The point of formal lawlessness is 
not that a state as a legal fiction has failed—an issue as to which there 
has been significant discussion in the literature.183 Rather, the 
insightful distinction drawn by Judge Crawford in The Creation of 
States in International Law is sufficient to create the formal 
lawlessness problem: 
The perils of the expression [failed state] go back to a conceptual 
confusion at its core. The situations described by some writers as 
‘failed States’ are, evidently, crises of government or, if the 
vaguer term be preferred, governance. None of the situations so 
described – Somalia, the Congo, Liberia, etc. – has involved the 
extinction of the State in question, and it is difficult to see what 
possible basis there could be for supposing otherwise. No doubt 
in many cases the regime has failed – either in the narrow sense 
of the group of thugs and cronies controlling the Presidential 
palace or in the broader sense of the governmental system, civil 
service, army, opposition and all.184 
The legal fiction of statehood is less important in the context of 
formal lawlessness than the problem of failed governance.185 A failure 
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of the governmental system in the relevant area means that on a 
formal level, it is not only true that the actors effectively in charge of 
the area are themselves lawless, but that there is no government to 
which one could look for the re-introduction of order once bad non-
state actors in question have been expelled.186 In this context, the 
fiction that the bad actors were always subject to some (municipal) 
law that, though under-enforced, could be used as a measure of their 
conduct in the future fairly gives out.187  
In other words, the formal perspective presents a second problem 
logically unrelated to the pragmatic perspective. The pragmatic 
perspective demonstrates that the bad (non-state) actor responsible for 
lawlessness has to be expelled to reintroduce the protections of the 
rule of law to the population in question.188 The formal perspective 
adds that the governance structures that must step in the bad actor’s 
place still remain to be built.189 There is no sovereign who could 
immediately fill the void.190  
The distinction drawn at the formal level suggests that municipal 
law is a myth not just from the perspective that it is ineffective, or not 
in control.191 It is a myth also because whatever municipal structures 
of coercion lack any kind of authority.192 Formal lawlessness suggests 
that there is no structure of coercive decision-making that is in line 
with community expectations of how government is permitted to 
act.193 Whatever decision-making still exists within the confines of 
the sovereign relies increasingly, if not solely on naked power rather 
than legal authority.194 In Professor Reisman’s terms, we are dealing 
with ineffective constitutive structures.195 But because it is the regime 
in place that makes the constitutive structures ineffective, returning 
                                                            
186. See Hannah Woolaver, State Failure, Sovereign Equality and Non-Intervention: 
Assessing Claimed Rights to Intervene in Failed States, 32 WIS. INT’L L.J. 595, 602 (2014) 
(defining state failure as the “absence or near-total ineffectiveness of central government”). 
187. See id. 
188. See supra Section I.B. 
189. See Woolaver, supra note 186, at 602. 
190. See id. 
191. W. Michael Reisman, Myth System and Operational Code, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD 
PUB. ORD. 229, 230 (1977) (“Hence we encounter two ‘relevant’ normative systems: one 
which is supposed to apply and which continues to enjoy lip service among elites and one 
which is actually applied. Neither should be confused with actual behavior, which may be 
discrepant from both.”). 
192. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 16, 26.  
193. See id. 
194. See id. at 26. 
195. See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 118-20. 
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more effective control to the regime does little to increase the 
lawfulness of governance.196 
ISIL’s rule in Syria presents a dual pragmatic and formal 
lawlessness problem. It is not sufficient to turn over ISIL-held 
territory to forces loyal to Assad to restore lawful order.197 These 
forces certainly nominally act on behalf of a sovereign that is 
formally in charge of the territory in question.198 But simply ousting 
ISIL and leaving the territory in the hands of the Syrian army would 
do little to eliminate the underlying problem of rule by arbitrary 
force.199 
The Syrian experience is coming dangerously close to that of a 
failed state.200 The central government is certainly ineffective with 
                                                            
196. See id. 
197. See Press Release, U.S. State Dep’t, The Syrian Crisis: U.S. Assistance and Support 
for the Transition (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/223955.htm 
(noting that “[e]fforts to find a diplomatic solution to the Syria crisis are based on the Final 
Communiqué of the 30 June 2012 Action Group meeting in Geneva. The process set forth by 
the Communiqué is supported by the United States and the broad partnership of nations known 
as the "London 11" that are pressing for a negotiated political solution to the Syria conflict. 
The United States has been working vigorously to advance Syria’s transition through the 
"Geneva II" international conference based on the Communique: the establishment of a 
transitional governing body formed by mutual consent, exercising full executive powers over 
all government institutions. The transitional governing body will also be charged with 
reviewing the constitutional order and legal system and preparing for and conducting free and 
fair elections. Yet through two rounds of U.N.-sponsored negotiations in Geneva, the Asad 
regime’s refusal to engage in negotiations has stalled progress.”). 
198. See CIA, WORLD FACTBOOK: SYRIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html (listing Assad as chief of state of Syria). 
199. See Action Group for Syria, Final Communiqué (June 30, 2012), http://www.
un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf (requiring 
“immediate, credible and visible actions by the Government of Syria to implement the other 
items of the six-point plan including: o Intensification of the pace and scale of release of 
arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons 
involved in peaceful political activities; provision without delay through appropriate channels 
of a list of all places in which such persons are being detained; the immediate organization of 
access to such locations; and the provision through appropriate channels of prompt responses 
to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such persons; Ensuring 
freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa 
policy for them; Respecting freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as 
legally guaranteed.”) Russian claims to the contrary are addressed further below. As a matter 
of analysis, the Russian claims of supporting the Syrian regime do nothing to address the 
authority vacuum currently experienced in Syria. It is thus not an effective prescription to 
address the ISIL problem (if it was ever actually intended as such in the first place.). 
200. See Joel Slawotsky, Partnering with Despots and Failed Regimes: Rogue Banking 
as a Primary Violation of International Law, 16 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 73, 100 (2014) 
(“Another example of a failed state is Syria where the current leader, President Assad, has 
engaged in a civil war with Syrian citizens with an estimated death count in the thousands.”); 
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regard to large areas of territory that are currently embroiled by civil 
war.201 This civil war at least so far has not led to a decisive victory of 
either Assad’s forces or the rebels.202 Simply removing ISIL from the 
equation is likely going to do little to change this dynamic. It would 
simply put Raqqa and other Syrian territory held by ISIL back in play 
for conquest and re-conquest by either side in the civil war.203 
Critically, in this context one can see how the reaction to the loss 
of control or power by the Syrian regime effectively eroded, and 
continues to erode, the regime’s authority.204 The response of the 
Syrian government to loss of control—facially pragmatic 
lawlessness—was to ratchet up a coercive means to re-establish 
control.205 This increase in coercive force revealed that the 
government was far less effective in controlling its territory than 
                                                                                                                                     
Joshua A. Frey, The New Communication: Leveraging Community Relations to Transition 
from Wars Amongst the People to Peace Amongst the People, 38 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 
213, 218 (2014) (listing Syria as a failed state alongside Somalia and Libya); Ex UN Envoy 
Predicts Syria Will Be ‘Failed State’, BBC (June 8, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-27754732 (reporting a statement by Lakhdar Brahimi that Syria could become a 
failed state); Karl W. Eikenberry, A Grand Strategy for Failed States, DEFINING IDEAS (Feb. 
17, 2015), http://www.hoover.org/research/grand-strategy-failed-states (including Syria in the 
list of failed states for which the United States needs a containment strategy). 
201. Compare Woolaver, supra note 186, at 602 (defining ineffectiveness as key trait of 
failed state), with Raja Adbulrahim, Syria Steps up Airstrikes in Rebel-Held Areas of Aleppo, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/syria-steps-up-airstrikes-on-rebel-
held-aleppo-1429204918 (discussing Syrian government use of shrapnel bombs to regain 
Aleppo), and Anne Barnard & Hwaida Saad, Islamists Seize Control of Syrian City in 
Northwest, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/world/middleeast
/islamist-militants-capture-syrian-town.html (“President Bashar al-Assad has hung on during a 
four-year insurgency, but his forces have been unable to retake control of large parts of Syria, 
and in recent weeks insurgents opposed both to his rule and to the Islamic State, also known as 
ISIS or ISIL, have made advances in the north and south.”). 
202. See supra notes 156-58. 
203. See Yaroslav Trofimov, In Islamic State Stronghold of Raqqa, Foreign Fighters 
Dominate, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-islamic-state-stronghold-
of-raqqa-foreign-fighters-dominate-1423087426 (noting the frontline between ISIL and the 
Free Syrian Army around Aleppo). 
204. See supra Section I.A.2. 
205. See Ben Hubbard, An Ever-Bleaker Syria, From All Vantage Points, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/15/world/an-ever-bleaker-syria-from-all-
vantage-points.html; Syrian Center for Policy Research, Syria Alienation and Violence: Impact 
of Syria Crisis Report 2014, at 10 (Mar. 2015), http://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/alie
nation_and_violence_impact_of_the_syria_crisis_in_2014_eng.pdf (“As the institutions of 
violence have expanded and been reinforced they have spread hatred, extremism and 
polarization. These institutions primarily serve the objectives of the powers of subjugation 
through oppression, fanaticism and fundamentalism, regardless of the will of people. This 
created a fissure and great divide between Syrians and different dominating institutions that 
has significantly aggravated estrangement and alienation among the majority of people.”). 
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might have been presumed—and thus undermined the government’s 
authority by undermining the community perception that the state 
could swiftly re-establish itself.206 This increase in coercive force 
further made the application of power by the Syrian regime 
increasingly arbitrary and barbaric thus further removing the Syrian 
regime’s actions from the authoritative expectations of the Syrian 
population.207 The reaction to a loss of control through increasingly 
barbaric uses of force was precisely what undermined the authority of 
the Syrian regime and confirmed that its rule introduces not just a 
pragmatic lawlessness problem, but a formal one. 
C. The Functional Dimension 
The problem gets more complex still. The issues presented by 
the Syrian crisis transcend pragmatic and formal lawlessness—the 
presence of a lawless non-state actor with no authoritative 
government to step in its place.208 ISIL’s presence in Syria showcases 
a third, functional, form of lawlessness—one in which pragmatic and 
formal lawlessness are symptoms of a deeper functional problem: 
there is no social process in place out of which lawful governance 
could re-emerge.  
Much like there is a readily identifiable distinction between the 
pragmatic and formal perspectives of lawlessness, there is a readily 
available distinction of the functional perspective, as well.209 Both the 
pragmatic and the formal perspectives are focused primarily upon law 
as an autonomous subject of inquiry.210 Lawlessness is defined by its 
relationship to law and legal process.211 Both the pragmatic and the 
formal perspectives thus focus upon certain qualities of the absence of 
law and legal process that can be ascertained by lawyers and legal 
scholars from within their respective discourses.212 
But lawlessness is not only—and not even principally—a legal 
phenomenon.213 It is a social problem.214 Meaningful engagement of 
                                                            
206. See Syria Crisis Report 2014, supra note 205, at 10. 
207. See id. 
208. See supra Section I.B. 
209. See supra Section I.B. 
210. See supra Section I.B. 
211. See supra Section I.B. 
212. Id. 
213. See, e.g., Robin West, Reconstructing the Rule of Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 215, 218 
(2001) (“The lawyer professionally committed to the moral value of the Rule of Law, so 
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lawlessness must look not only to the pragmatic and formal aspects of 
lawlessness as they arise within the legal discourse itself.215 Rather, 
they must also situate lawlessness in the larger context of social 
processes in which such lawlessness exists.216 So far, lawlessness has 
been addressed as if there were a clean dividing line between legal 
discourse and social discourse.217 Lawlessness provides an intuitive 
case that such lines simply cannot be drawn: when law encounters its 
own putative absence, it is asked to lift itself up as if by its own 
bootstraps to provide a legal response to the problem. “Law” can 
function in this manner if it is a frame of social processes into which 
legal process is interwoven—as opposed to being an entirely 
autonomous social (or metaphysical) process of its own.218 
From this broader functional perspective, lawlessness emerges 
when the broader social processes to which law contributes are 
themselves eviscerated. Law arises because there are stable 
expectations, which community members place in social decision.219 
These expectations are anchored in the social fabric that otherwise 
binds community members to their respective communities and, thus, 
to each other.220 When this fabric frays, or worse, disappears, so does 
law or legal process;221 the predicate for the stability of 
expectations—the network of social interaction that gives meaning to 
the relationship between persons, objects, obligations, and status—is 
itself no longer present.222 Absent this predicate, law becomes a 
meaningless assertion. 
                                                                                                                                     
understood, has a critical (in both senses) role to play in decrying the peculiar form of social 
injustice that is found in lawlessness.”). 
214. Id. 
215. See Section I.B.1-2. 
216. LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, 130-01 (discussing the relationship 
between law and other social processes in realist jurisprudence). 
217. See Section I.B.1-2. 
218. See Pierre Legrand, Siting Foreign Law: How Derrida Can Help, 21 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 595, 609 (2011) (eschewing the crude binary distinction of law and non-
law). 
219. LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 63-4. 
220. Id. 
221. See SCHMITT, supra note 24, at 20; Pocock, supra note 11, at 70, 75. 
222. See A Jurisprudence from the Perspective of the “Political Superior,” supra note 
55, at 617 (“A distinction can be drawn between decisions which are taken entirely on the 
basis of naked power without regard to the expectations of rightness of the people influenced 
by them and decisions which conform to those expectations, but lack all effectiveness. From 
the perspective of a jurisprudence of social choice, the word “law” is reserved for those 
processes of decision which are both consistent with the expectations of rightness held by 
members of a community (authoritative decisions) and which are effective (controlling 
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It is this form of lawlessness that hides in the background of 
Professor Reisman’s treatment of lawlessness—but, as if an evil 
jinn—is never permitted to escape into the open.223 Current events in 
the Middle East have certainly opened the door for it to escape. What 
functional lawlessness describes is a fifth constitutive configure in 
addition to constitutive processes (1) without hierarchical institutions, 
(2) with ineffective hierarchical institutions, (3) with partly effective 
hierarchical institutions, and (4) with highly effective hierarchical 
institutions.224 It is a configuration that eviscerates constitutive 
configurations themselves by uprooting individuals from a context in 
which they could form authoritative expectations—and as such have 
the capacity to hold constitutive commitments of whatever kind.225 
Syria provides a sad example for such a functional lawlessness 
problem. The carnage and displacement of Syrian citizens brought 
about by the civil war has not only had a devastating cost in terms of 
human life, it has had a deep social cost.226 More than eleven million 
people of Syria’s 22 million population are reportedly displaced by 
the conflict.227 This displacement has severe repercussions for the 
expectations Syrian nationals can have in leading their day-to-day 
lives; in the short-term, their expectations of how to formulate 
strategies for survival is frequently as dim as it is a struggle for bare 
personal survival (depending in part on where in Syria they reside or 
                                                                                                                                     
decisions). These are, one might add, likely to be the most efficient decisions, for they draw, 
for their support, both on effective power and on the expectations of authority of those to 
whom they are directed. While the particular mix of authority and control may vary widely, a 
conception of law as authoritative and controlling decision protects the person making choices 
from exercises in irrelevance, whether because of absence of authority or absence of control.”).  
223. It is the catastrophe presaged in the alternative future in which law is not vigorously 
defended. See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 21, 477. 
224. Id. at 117. 
225. One might call functional lawlessness the paradigmatic corrosive disadvantage. See 
NUSSBAUM, supra note 44, at 44 (“corrosive disadvantage is the flip side of fertile capability; 
it is a deprivation that has particularly large effects in other areas of life.”). 
226. See Somini Sengupta, U.N. Calls on Western Nations to Shelter Syrian Refugees, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/18/world/middleeast/un-calls-
on-western-nations-to-shelter-syrian-refugees.html (noting that “the war in Syria is creating 
the worst global refugee crisis in decades . . .”). 
227. Local Ceasefires Could Be Path to Peace in Syria, OXFAM (Mar. 13, 2015), 
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/stories/local-ceasefires-could-be-a-path-to-peace-in-
syria/ (“Nearly four years of bloody civil war have torn the country apart, driving more than 11 
million people from their homes and leaving about half of Syria’s 22 million citizens in need 
of humanitarian assistance.”). 
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by which route they have been able to flee).228 Their long-term 
expectations appear similarly intractable given the lack of meaningful 
policymaking even with regard to the refugee crisis by Western 
powers.229  
This social cost prevents a strategy of local resistance of sorts to 
lawlessness. Such a resistance would look to community leaders to 
continue the task of bringing some form of lawfulness to the day-to-
day lives of the local community.230 Thus, local elders, judges, and 
lawyers could functionally support an organized and authoritative 
form of prescription even when there are no governmental processes 
to fall back on.231 Law would be kept alive in the interactions between 
                                                            
228. Rick Lyman, Winter Poses New Danger for Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2015, 
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(reporting the number of internally displaced at 7 million and reporting further that “‘This is 
the biggest refugee population from a single conflict in a generation,’ Antonio Guterres, the 
United Nations high commissioner for refugees, said in a statement. Mr. Guterres, once again, 
warned that international aid was not keeping pace with the scale of the crisis, and that many 
refugees were ‘sinking deeper into poverty.’”). 
229. See Tim Arango, Merkel Links Turkey’s E.U. Hopes to Stemming Flows of 
Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/19/world/merkel-
links-turkeys-eu-hopes-to-stemming-flow-of-refugees.html?ref=topics (detailing the potential 
role of Turkey to stem the migrant crisis); Andrew Higgins, Migrant Crisis Leads to Calls for 
Tighter Borders in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/
world/europe/migrant-crisis-europe.html (“The meeting, which stretched late into the night, 
signaled a shift from the message of open-armed welcome conveyed over the summer by 
Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany toward what critics describe as a ‘fortress Europe’ 
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230. See Sophie de Schaepdrijver, Occupation, Propaganda and the Idea of Belgium, in 
EUROPEAN CULTURE IN THE GREAT WAR: THE ARTS, ENTERTAINMENT AND PROPAGANDA 
1914-1918 at 267, 270 (Aviel Roshwald & Richard Stites eds., 2002) (discussing such Belgian 
efforts when the Belgian central government failed during World War I). 
231. See id. (“The only ongoing ‘Belgian’ authority under occupation was local. As had 
obtained in earlier centuries, it now devolved upon the country’s 2,633 communes to defend 
their citizens against the encroachments of invading powers. Four years of occupation would 
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Brand Whitlock, the US minister to Belgium, called ‘that patriotic colony in German prisions.’ 
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those subjected to lawlessness.232 By empowering the local 
community leaders “through forms of interim or contingent 
international governance,” it would thus be possible to re-establish 
some form of legal order once the external threat from ISIL and the 
Syrian government has been removed.233 
The Syrian problem is that no such strategy will prove effective. 
The carnage and displacement in Syria has been too severe and too 
prolonged to permit recourse to such a strategy.234 The very local 
leaders whom one could count on to maintain the vestiges of lawful 
government are precisely the persons targeted for killing by any 
means necessary.235 There are few local structures left intact in order 
to maintain any kind of authoritative governance on the ground.236  
The areas held by ISIL in Syria are not only pragmatically and 
formally lawless.237 They are not currently capable of maintaining any 
indigenous processes of proto-legal decision in day-to-day life.238 
They are lawless from a functional point of view, as well as from a 
                                                                                                                                     
A constant level of low-key resistance was kept up for the duration of the war, even as 
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attacks on civil leaders hostile to Assad); Neil MacFarquhar & Hala Droubi, In Syria’s Civil 
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238. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 66 (discussing decision processes 
premised upon authority and control in primitive societies). 
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pragmatic and formal point of view.239 And in this state of functional 
lawlessness, legal decision is and must be meaningless. 
D. The Progression of Lawlessness 
Conceiving of lawlessness as a progression of pragmatic, formal, 
and functional lawlessness showcases how lawlessness evolves from 
a momentary loss of control to a potential for the total loss of social 
fabric and thus complete lawlessness. It has also shown that the 
typically easiest prescription to a momentary loss of control—get 
control back by coercive means—is precisely one of the accelerants 
for the progression of lawlessness.240 The explanation of lawlessness 
by reference to its effects on both the axioms of control and authority 
can explain why and how this is so.241 By using both axioms of 
control and authority, it has further showcased that an overplaying of 
control decisions can have the effect of completely eroding the 
capacity for authoritative decision making in society.242 It has mapped 
both the decisions that dissolve legality or lawfulness (first formal 
legality or lawfulness than functional legality or lawfulness) and the 
social processes pursuant to which these decisions can have that 
effect.243  
IV. LAWLESSNESS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law appears at first blush to fare better in its 
engagement of lawlessness. Thus, it is certainly safe to say that both 
the acts of ISIL on the one hand and the Syrian government on the 
other hand run afoul of international legal norms.244 From an 
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international legal perspective municipal lawlessness is simply a 
violation of an existing international legal order and can thus be made 
sense of as such.245 
But this conclusion is too facile. The assertion that the acts of 
ISIL and the Syrian government violate international law do very 
little to help the current victims of their respective atrocities.246 In the 
case of ISIL at least, it is safe to say that the protestations of 
unlawfulness not only failed to stem violence but apparently fueled 
it.247 In the context of humanitarian crises like Syria, statements of 
international legality on their own are thus relatively meaningless 
unless they are backed by some cognizable sanction that would tend 
to have a real-world ability (as opposed to a moral exhortation) to 
change facts on the ground.248 Addressing lawlessness from the perch 
of an armchair academic as fully resolved because of the presence of 
some metaphysical order conjured in the laboratories of the law 
review article or op-ed piece runs the risk of mistaking law for 
theology and the plight of millions for a hypothetical in a final 
examination.249  
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intervention serves ISIL’s strategic interests. In fact, it burned Kassasbeh to death to provoke 
such responses.”). 
248.  The Prescribing Function in World Constitutive Process: How International Law 
Is Made, supra note 93, at 251(“In certain marginal situations, authority may constitute the 
sole base value for a particular process of prescription. This may be treated as prescription 
only if the requisite element of control is subsequently brought into play, thus creating in the 
audience the expectation that certain behavior not only should be followed but will indeed be 
required.”). 
249. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 126 (noting that even attempts to 
rid pure legal inquiry from metaphysics backfired because Kelsen “in his effort to cleanse 
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To ascertain the ability of international law to resolve the 
lawlessness problem on its own terms it is thus necessary to get one’s 
hands dirty.250 It is a question of what sanction international law 
actually permits to rid the world of lawless actors and assist those 
previously ruled by the thugs in question to return to a form of 
relatively lawful governance.251 When we consider international law 
from this functional perspective, the Syrian Civil War provides a stark 
example that international law provides little more comfort in dealing 
with ISIL’s lawlessness than the formal myths of municipal law.252 
Worse still, upon closer analysis, international legal argument validly 
relies upon formal perspectives of sovereign rule that are contradicted 
outright if viewed through the municipal legal lens.253 The 
lawlessness afflicting social processes on the ground thus must 
transfer to the international legal plane. 
This Part will map this transnational transference of lawlessness 
by comparing the response to ISIL in Iraq and in Syria. It will lay out 
the robust response in Iraq first.254 It will then look to the far less 
robust response in Syria.255 It will then dissect that the comparison 
reveals how an increasing loss of authority in-country leads to an 
increased transnational transference of lawlessness from the 
municipal to the international plane.256 This transnational transference 
has the effect of corroding the authority of international decision 
making processes in a proportionate amount to the loss of authority 
on the domestic scale.257 
                                                                                                                                     
jurisprudence of metaphysical elements and value judgments, has cleansed it of any helpful 
reference to what he describes as ‘natural reality.’”).  
250. See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 100 (discussing the importance of dirty work in the 
context of international law). 
251. It looks for the operational code, the actually practiced form of authoritative 
decision making by relevant decision makers with their proverbial “hand on the button” as 
opposed to the idealized version of the normative world order distributed for public 
consumption. See Myth Systems and Operational Code, supra note 191, at 231 (discussing the 
distinction between myth system and operational code); Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to 
Transnational Terrorism under the Jus ad Bellum: A Normative Framework, 56 NAVAL L. 
REV. 1, passim (2008) (discussing the change of the operational code of international law in 
the fight against terrorism following the 9/11 attacks based upon the actions of the United 
States and its allies). 
252. See supra section III.B. 
253. See supra Section IV.B. 
254. See supra Section IV.A. 
255. See supra Section IV.B. 
256. See supra Section IV.C. 
257. Id. 
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A. International Response to ISIL in Iraq 
The problem international law faces in dealing with lawlessness 
is already apparent in the context of the current international efforts to 
expel ISIL from Iraq. At first blush, it appears that the international 
legal order can anchor the legality of intervention against ISIL in 
Iraq’s consent to and request for military aid.258 But even this 
apparent consensus is problematic given the contextual factors 
currently in play in Iraq.259 
1. The Consent-Based Case 
As discussed in Part II, ISIL is active in both Iraq and Syria.260 
ISIL held and continues to hold territory in Iraq close to the Syrian 
border and into the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq.261 At one point, 
ISIL even militarily threatened Baghdad.262  
ISIL’s conduct in Iraq is well-documented.263 It does not differ 
significantly from ISIL’s conduct in Syria.264 Thus, ISIL in the Iraqi 
context similarly is accused of substantive violations of basic 
international norms—most notably, ISIL is in most likelihood 
committing genocide within Iraq.265 ISIL also stands accused of the 
same arbitrary conduct discussed in the Syrian context above.266 ISIL 
                                                            
258. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
259. See supra Section IV.A.2. 
260. See supra Section II. 
261. Battle for Iraq and Syria in Maps, BBC (Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034.  
262. Alastair Beach, Iraq Asks for US Ground Troops as ISIL Threaten Baghdad, 
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11156
264/Iraq-asks-for-US-ground-troops-as-Isil-threaten-Baghdad.html (reporting ISIL’s military 
threat). 
263. Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
supra note 244, at 15 (making the case for international legal criminal responsibility for ISIL 
members for the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes); Nick 
Cumming-Bruce, United Nations Investigators Accuse ISIS of Genocide over Attacks on 
Yazidis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/20/world/middleeast/
isis-genocide-yazidis-iraq-un-panel.html (making the same case); Amnesty Int’l Rep. 2014/15, 
The State of the World’s Human Rights 3 (2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
pol10/0001/2015/en/ (making the same case).  
264. Amnesty Int’l Rep. 2014/15, The State of the World’s Human Rights 3 (2015), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0001/2015/en/ (dealing with ISIL’s atrocities in 
both Iraq and Syria in one section and drawing no distinctions between them). 
265. See supra Section IV.B. 
266. Section II.A. 
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in both contexts, Syria and Iraq, thus presents the same pragmatic 
lawlessness problem.267 
Unlike in the Syrian context, Iraq continues to have a 
functioning government.268 This government is reasonably 
representative of the various ethnic and religious groups making up 
Iraq.269 Although the government is still under some scrutiny in its 
ability to provide a stable and reasonable framework for the 
governance of Iraq,270 the international community by and large 
recognizes it as a far more effective governance structure than the 
current Syrian central government.271 Judging from the point of view 
of municipal formal rule of law, Iraq has far stronger credentials to 
offer than Syria.272 
Iraq has waived its sovereignty in asking for international 
assistance in defeating ISIL on its territory.273 Premised upon this 
                                                            
267. Id.  
268. U.S. State Department, U.S. Relations with Iraq, Fact Sheet (Sept. 7, 2012), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm (“Iraq has functioning government institutions 
including an active legislature, is playing an increasingly constructive role in the region, and 
has a bright economic future as oil revenues surpass pre-Saddam production levels with 
continued rapid growth to come.”).  
269. See Madeleine Snyder, Post-War Iraq: The Triangle of Ethnic Tensions, 35(4) 
HARV. INT’L REV. (June 14, 2014), http://hir.harvard.edu/archives/5766 (“The new Iraqi 
government shows signs of successful power sharing and limitation, as a Shia Prime Minister 
and a Kurdish President must authorize executive decisions and have those decisions approved 
by a Sunni speaker of parliament and the Iraq Council of Representatives. This federalist 
model of government does little to smooth over the ethnic divides so prominent in the politics 
of the country, but it allows for each ethnic group to preserve its autonomy, protect vital 
interests, and provides the inclusive representation necessary to support the nascent Iraqi 
government.”). 
270. Id.; see also Amnesty International Report 2014/15, The State of the World’s 
Human Rights 41 (2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0001/2015/en/ (“In 
Iraq, the government’s response to IS’s advance was to stiffen the security forces with pro-
government Shi’a militias and let them loose on Sunni communities seen as anti-government 
or sympathetic to IS, while mounting indiscriminate air attacks on Mosul and other centres 
held by IS forces.”). 
271. Tom Malinowski, Seizing the Post-ISIL Opportunity for Democracy and Inclusion, 
U.S. STATE DEPT. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2015/237814.htm 
(discussing planning for a post-civil war Iraq). 
272. See Section II.B.  
273. See Martin Chulov & Spencer Ackerman, Iraq Requests US Air Strikes as ISIS 
Insurgents Tighten Grip on Oil Refinery, GUARDIAN (June 18, 2014), http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2014/jun/18/iraq-request-us-air-strikes-isis-baiji-oil (“Iraq has asked the US to 
stage air attacks on Sunni insurgents as the Islamist fighters edged closer to full control of 
Iraq's largest oil refinery and continued to hold out against troops trying to retake the city of 
Tal Afar”); Julian Borger & Patrick Wintour, Obama Vows to Destroy ISIS’ “Brand of Evil” 
As Iraq Requests Help from Britain, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2014/sep/24/obama-isis-brand-of-evil-uk-air-strikes-iraq (“Cameron met the Iraqi 
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request, a broad international coalition has in fact agreed to come to 
the aid of the Iraqi government in addressing the ISIL threat.274 The 
declarations of many of the relevant governments participating in the 
coalition in fact refer expressly to the consent in question.275 State 
consent arguably would vitiate any claim that international action in 
the territorial borders of Iraq would constitute an internationally 
wrongful act.276 There is little diplomatic protest over international 
assistance to Iraq in fighting ISIL, thus suggesting that, in this context 
at least, international law would have a means available to combat a 
pragmatic form of lawlessness when the territorial sovereign is unable 
to do so on its own.277 
                                                                                                                                     
prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, in New York to receive a formal request for military action, 
clearing a vital legal hurdle to UK involvement.”). 
274. For a formal list of coalition partners, see Special Presidential Envoy for the Global 
Coalition to Counter ISIL, Index, http://www.state.gov/s/seci/index.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 
2015) (stating that “over 60 coalition partners have committed themselves to the goals of 
eliminating the threat posed by ISIL and have already contributed in various capacities to the 
effort to combat ISIL in Iraq, the region and beyond.”). Although not technically part of the 
coalition, Iran has similarly worked as a partner in the fight against ISIL. See also Mohamad 
Bazzi, Iran Will Do What it Takes to Fight ISIS, CNN (Jan. 3, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/
2015/01/03/opinion/bazzi-iran-iraq/ (“Iranian officials have slowly acknowledged their covert 
operations inside Iraq. ‘Iran has helped Iraq in an advisory role and has quickly organized Iraqi 
militias,’ Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ Aerospace 
Forces, told the Fars News Agency in September. ‘Were it not for Iran, the Islamic State 
would have taken over Iraqi Kurdistan.’”). 
275. See, e.g., Background Briefing, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/08/background-briefing-senior-administration-
officials-iraq (“with respect to international law, we believe that any actions we would take, to 
include airstrikes, would be consistent with international law, as we have a request from the 
Government of Iraq. So we’ve essentially been asked and invited to take these actions by the 
Government of Iraq, and that provides the international legal basis”). For a summary and 
discussion of the statements of French, UK, Australian, and Belgian officials, see Raphael Van 
Steenberghe, The Alleged Prohibition on Intervening in Civil Wars Is Still Alive after 
Airstrikes Against Islamic State in Iraq: A Response to Dapo Akande and Zachary Vermeer, 
EJILTALK! (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-alleged-prohibition-on-intervening-in-
civil-wars-is-still-alive-after-the-airstrikes-against-islamic-state-in-iraq-a-response-to-dapo-
akande-and-zachary-vermeer/#more-13063.  
276. ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-Second Session, UN GAOR, 
55th Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 20, U.N. Doc. A/55/10 (2000) (“Valid consent by a State to the 
commission of a given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to 
the former State to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent.”). 
277. For a discussion of a similar issues in the context of US strikes in Pakistan with 
Pakistan’s consent, see Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law 
Supremacy, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 33-42 (2013) (arguing that “international law does not 
currently preclude a state from using consent as a basis for employing force in another state’s 
territory” but that “it may rely on consent use only that ‘quality of force’ that the host state 
could use”). 
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2. Problems with the Consent-Based Case 
Formal questions could arise whether intervention in Iraq on the 
side of the Iraqi government constitutes an impermissible assistance 
in an internal war or civil conflict.278 As Professor Dapo Akande and 
Zachary Vermeer develop, “many scholars, and indeed some States, 
have suggested that there is a general prohibition on military 
assistance to governments in a situation of civil war or internal 
rebellion.”279 Civil war for purposes of the argument refers to “a non-
international armed conflict” that is “between the established 
government of a State and one or more insurgent movements whose 
aim is to overthrow the government or political economic or social 
order of the State, or to achieve secession or self-government for any 
part of the State” or “between two or more groups contending for 
control of the State in the absence of an established government.”280  
Professor Akande and Vermeer submit that the “conflict between 
the Iraqi Government and Islamic State seems to fall within the scope 
of the prohibition.”281 Principally, the conflict falls within the putative 
prohibition because “[a]t the time the airstrikes commenced [ISIL] 
exercised control over a significant portion of Iraqi territory, allowing 
it . . . to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.”282 
This cautionary position gains the more traction when placed in the 
context of ISIL’s ability to hold majority Sunni ground in Iraq, 
exercise governmental functions in those areas, and enjoys a 
modicum of popular support from the Sunni-majority population—
and, arguably, more support than the multi-ethnic Iraqi central 
government.283  
Professor Akande and Vermeer’s argument has not gained 
significant traction in the response to ISIL in Iraq on the ground. In 
fact, current state practice in the fight against ISIL in Iraq may very 
                                                            
278. Dapo Akande & Zachary Vermeer, The Airstrikes Against Islamic State and the 
Alleged Prohibition on Military Assistance to Governments in Civil Wars, EJILTALK! (Feb. 2, 
2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-airstrikes-against-islamic-state-in-iraq-and-the-alleged-
prohibition-on-military-assistance-to-governments-in-civil-wars/. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. (relying upon the work of the Institut de Droit International, Louise Doswald-
Beck, Christine Gray, and Olivier Corten).  
281. Id.  
282. Id. 
283. ISIL Wins Support From Iraq’s Sunni Tribes, AL JAZEERA (June 4, 2015), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/sunni-sheiks-pledge-allegiance-isil-iraq-anbar-
150604074642668.html.  
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well suggest that the rule is, as a matter of form, inapposite to the 
conflict. The intuition underlying Professor Akande and Vermeer’s 
thought nevertheless is functionally insightful: it points out the first 
elements of a transnational transference of lawlessness; there is a 
weakening of the authority of an international coercive response to 
lawlessness arising directly from the weakening of the authority of the 
domestic government the coercive action is supposed to assist.284 As 
comedian Jon Stewart acerbically put it, the Sunni population of Iraq 
prefers a brutal, repressive, medieval Taliban-like state to the 
government the US left it with.285 This preference begins to have 
international legal repercussions.286 
B. Intervention in Syria 
The problem becomes more pronounced in the context of armed 
action against ISIL in Syria. At an early point in the campaign, many 
of the coalition members who participate in strikes against ISIL in 
Iraq did not participate in the US campaign against ISIL in Syria.287 
The reason for the distinction is, on its face, straightforward: action 
against ISIL in Iraq is supported by the request and consent of the 
Iraqi government.288 Action against ISIL in Syria by Western forces is 
not supported by a similar request and consent of the Syrian 
government.289 Though the initial resistance of US coalition members 
has softened in light of perceived foreign policy needs since the 
                                                            
284.  See Section IV.C.1. 
285. The Daily Show (July 27, 2015), http://thedailyshow.cc.com/full-episodes/
mtwqgq/july-27--2015---david-mccullough, at minute 6:45-6:59.  
286. See Section IV.C.1. 
287. Tom Bowman, Despite Coalition Partners, U.S. Has Done Most Airstrikes Against 
ISIS, NPR (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/02/06/384345873/despite-coalition-
partners-u-s-has-done-most-airstrikes-against-isis (“The U.S. is doing more than 90 percent of 
all the bombing runs in Syria.”); Stephen Castle & Steven Erlanger, 3 Nations Offer Limited 
Support of Attack on ISIS, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/
world/europe/british-parliament-vote-isis-airstrikes.html (“Britain, Belgium and Denmark 
lined up Friday behind the United States in its fight against the Islamic State group, agreeing to 
military operations in Iraq — but drawing a line for now against direct intervention in Syria.”). 
288. See Section III.B. 
289. Alastair Jamieson & Jim Miklaszewski, Syria Given Information About U.S.-Led 
Airstrikes Against ISIS: Assad, NBC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/
storyline/isis-terror/syria-given-information-about-u-s-led-airstrikes-against-isis-n303381 (“In 
a rare interview, he also ruled out joining the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS as long as 
Washington was supporting rebels battling his regime, calling them ‘terrorists.’ ‘We don't have 
the will and we don't want [to] for one simple reason: because we cannot be [in] alliance with 
the country [that] supports the terrorism,’ Assad told the BBC's Jeremy Bowen.”). 
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beginning of the campaign, their original legal qualms remain largely 
unresolved.290 
Since the campaign against ISIL in Syria by Western forces 
without the consent of the Syrian government, the Syrian government 
has requested – and received – aid from Russian and Iranian forces.291 
These forces have since commenced armed interventions in Syria 
independent of Western efforts.292 These efforts, while facially 
justified by reference to the fight against ISIL, have instead targeted 
rebel forces fighting both ISIL and the Syrian government – and in 
some instances rebel forces equipped and trained by the US.293 The 
effect of Russian targeting decisions so far has been to strengthen 
                                                            
290.  See, e.g. Alissa J. Rubin, France Says It Will Join Air Campaign Against ISIS in 
Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/world/europe/france-
isis-syria-airstrikes.html (reporting a change in French policy towards conducting airstrikes in 
Syria because “the Islamic State had recently enlarged its territory to the point that it 
threatened rebel groups near Aleppo, and the major road network that leads to the Syrian 
capital, Damascus, and Lebanon”); Dan Bilefesky, British Pilots Have Been Conducting 
Airstrikes in Syria, Defense Ministry Confirms, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2015, http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/07/18/world/middleeast/british-pilots-have-been-conducting-airstrikes-in-
syria-defense-ministry-confirms.html (confirming British airstrikes in Syria “even though 
Parliament voted two years ago against military action there). For a discussion of the British 
municipal and international legal conundrum see Dapo Akande, Embedded Troops and the 
Use of Force in Syria: International and Domestic Law Questions, EJILTALK! (Sept. 11, 
2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/embedded-troops-and-the-use-of-force-in-syria-international-
and-domestic-law-questions/. 
291.  MacFarquhar, supra note 160; Russia’s Lavrov Says so far Only Syria Requested 
Direct Military Assistance, REUTERS (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/
14/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-requests-idUSKCN0S812820151014 (detailing Syrian 
request); Russia Parliament Approves Military Move in Syria, BBC (Sept. 30, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34400193 (detailing Russian strikes in Syria).  
292.  MacFarquhar,supra note 160 (“The lack of enthusiasm from Washington to 
Russia’s initiatives on Syria has been a disappointment to the Kremlin, and the meeting with 
Mr. Assad might put new pressure on the Obama administration to engage. Russia expressed 
displeasure on Tuesday that an agreement signed between the Pentagon and the Ministry of 
Defense earlier in the day had not gone further in forging cooperation in Syria”); Helene 
Cooper, Michael R. Gordon & Neil MacFarquhar, Russian Strike Targets in Syria, but Not 
ISIS Areas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/world/europe/
russia-airstrikes-syria.html. As of Oct. 21, 2015, Russia and the US have agreed upon very 
limited co-ordination solely for the purpose of engagement directly between US and Russian 
forces in the area. See Neil MacFarquhar, U.S. Agrees with Russia on Rules in Syrian Sky, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/world/middleeast/us-and-
russia-agree-to-regulate-all-flights-over-syria.html (“At a Pentagon briefing, Peter Cook, the 
department’s press secretary, said the agreement, called a memorandum of understanding, 
established safety protocols requiring the Russians and the United States-led international 
coalition fighting the Islamic State in Syria to maintain professional airmanship at all times, 
use specific communication frequencies and establish a communication line on the ground.”). 
293.  Russian Strike Targets in Syria, but Not ISIS Areas, supra note 292. 
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ISIL rather than weaken it, thus adding an additional layer of 
complexity to the international response.294 
The academic response to the US bombing campaign in Syria 
has been pronounced.295 Thus, commentators state that in the absence 
of Syrian consent, use of force in Syria would require U.N. Security 
Council authorization.296 This Security Council authorization, of 
course, is not forthcoming due to the alignment of the Russian 
Federation with the Assad regime and alignment of the US with 
opposition forces.297 Authorization of action in Syria would thus 
appear to depend upon Syrian consent to military action.298 In the 
current geopolitical environment, this would in essence mean that the 
US campaign against ISIL within the scope of Syrian authorization 
would free up Syrian forces to fight the Free Syrian Army more 
effectively—thus supporting one lawless actor in the attempt to 
degrade another.299 Contrary to Russian interests in the area, the US 
and its Western allies for obvious reasons seek to act in Syria without 
so strengthening the hand of the Assad regime.300 Consequently, 
                                                            
294. Anne Barnard & Thomas Erdbrink, ISIS Makes Gains in Syria Territory Bombed by 
Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/middleeast/
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295. See, e.g., Louise Arimatsu & Michael Schmitt, The Legal Basis for War Against 
ISIS Remains Contentious, GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
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international law experts agree that military operations against Isis in Iraq comport with 
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O’Connell, supra note 16; Trahan, supra note 16 (“Thus, while it is not impossible that air 
strikes in Syria could be justified under international law, the Administration still needs to 
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296. See O’Connell, supra note 16. 
297. See ‘Re-energized Diplomatic Effort’ Needed to Break Deadlock Over Syria, New 
Security Council President, UN NEWS CENTER, Sept. 4, 2013, http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=45774#.VUD0DNF0wdU. 
298. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
299. See Jamieson & Miklaszewski, supra note 289. 
300. Dennis Ross, A Strategy for Beating the Islamic State, How to Build a Regional 
Coalition of the Willing Against the Terrorist Group, POLITICO, Sept. 2, 2014, http://www.
politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/a-strategy-for-beating-isil-110524.html (“Small wonder, 
therefore, that the administration is struggling now to decide what it should do against ISIL in 
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much of the academic response has been stridently against the use of 
force in Syria.  
1. Collective Self-Defense 
Key defenders of the action in Syria point predominantly to the 
right of collective self-defense.301 Iraq has requested military aid in 
combating ISIL.302 ISIL is operating in both Iraq and Syria.303 Thus, 
effective intervention requires combating ISIL in both places.304 In 
order for Western powers to intervene in Syria, collective self-defense 
proponents submit, it must be shown that Syria is unwilling or unable 
to stop ISIL from attacking Iraq from Syrian bases and/or that ISIL 
fighters are targeted as part of a spill-over effect into Syria.305  
As champions of the collective self-defense rationale readily 
admit, the weakest link of their argument is proof with regard to the 
unwilling-or-unable prong of the self-defense argument.306 Thus, it is 
legally questionable whether a host state’s unwillingness or inability 
to interdict non-state actors from launching attacks from its territory 
into a neighboring state’s territory gives the neighboring state a right 
to launch military operations in the host state.307 To the extent that 
                                                                                                                                     
Syria. It wants to weaken ISIL without strengthening Assad, and yet not be drawn into the 
Syrian civil war. Avoidance as a strategy in Syria, however, is no longer tenable.”). 
301. Jennifer Daskal, Ashley Deeks, & Ryan Goodman, Strikes in Syria: The 
International Legal Framework, JUST SECURITY, (Sept. 24, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/
15479/strikes-syria-international-law-framework-daskal-deeks-goodman/ (“The U.S. 
government received a letter from the Iraqi government explicitly asking for U.S. help in the 
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notification to the United Nations, Iraq has specifically requested that the United States lead 
international efforts to strike ISIL sites inside Syria to suppress continuing attacks on Iraq and 
protect Iraqi citizens. Under a theory of collective self-defense, the United States is assisting 
Iraq in responding to the direct and ongoing threat posed by ISIL; the threat stems in part from 
ISIL forces in Syria; and Syria is either unable or unwilling to quell the threat, thereby 
justifying an incursion into Syria’s territory.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Obama’s ISIL Legal 
Rollout: Bungled, Clearly. But Illegal? Really?, JUST SECURITY, (Sept. 29, 2014), http://
justsecurity.org/15692/obamas-isil-legal-rollout-bungled-clearly-illegal-really/ (agreeing with 
Daskal, Deeks, and Goodman’s assessment). 
302. See articles cited supra note 283. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. 
306. See Daskal, supra note 301 (“The weakest link in the chain is the unwilling or 
unable test.”). 
307. Id. (As one of us has written, “The ‘unwilling or unable’ test is now a fairly well 
settled part of the US government’s legal position. Nevertheless, it remains controversial under 
international law.”) (quoting Ryan Goodman, International Law on Airstrikes in Syria, JUST 
SECURITY (Aug. 28, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/14414/international-law-airstrikes-isis-
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international law does not recognize a right to self-defense against 
non-state actors under such circumstances absent proof of complicity 
of the host state in the actions of the non-state actors thus making the 
acts of the non-state actor attributable to the host state, this argument 
is dead on arrival as an international legal defense of the armed 
response to lawless actors in Syria.308 
Even assuming that the argument is sound as a matter of 
international law,309 it would further have to be established that the 
action in question is necessary and proportionate to protecting against 
and suppressing the threat in question – or that the fight against ISIL 
in Syria represents a true cross-border spill-over of the fight in Iraq.310 
The premise that action against ISIL in Syria are necessary and 
                                                                                                                                     
syria/); see also Monica Hakimi, Defensive Force Against Non-State Actors: The State of Play, 
9 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 3 (2015) (“Efforts to clarify the law on the use of defensive force against 
non-State actors are premature. The evident ambiguities and inconsistences in the practice 
reflect an ongoing struggle over the law's proper content. This struggle cannot neatly be 
resolved because the international legal system is, at bottom, decentralized.”). 
308. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 168, Dec. 19, 2005. For a discussion of the current state of I.C.J. jurisprudence, see 
Christian Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT'L’L. 359, 385 (2009) (“In 
between strict adherence to tradition and radical departure, the more convincing way to 
accommodate the new practice is to opt for an approach which retains the traditional 
understanding of self-defence as a justification for the use of force between states, but 
recognizes the existence of special rules on attribution of terrorist activities. This more 
moderate (but still important) re-reading indeed Seems to be borne out by state practice: states 
invoking self-defence do make an effort to identify links between the territorial state and the 
terrorist organization in question. What they no longer Seem to do is to identify links that are 
strong enough to amount to ‘effective control’ as required by the Nicaragua test. Instead, 
contemporary practice suggests that a territorial state has to accept anti-terrorist measures of 
self-defence directed against its territory where it is responsible for complicity in the activities 
of terrorists based on its territory—either because of its support below the level of direction 
and control or because it has provided a safe haven for terrorists. In short, pursuant to this 
more moderate re-reading, modern practice points towards a special standard of imputability in 
relations between terrorist groups and host states, arguably most closely resembling 
international rules against ‘aiding and abetting’ illegal conduct.”). 
309. Hakimi, supra note 307 (“The operations in Syria have accentuated three 
preexisting trends on the use of defensive force against non-State actors. First, the claim that 
international law absolutely prohibits such force is losing ground. The reaction to the operation 
against the Islamic State in Syria has been positive. Second, States are still floundering on 
when to permit such force. Many States Seem unsure about the correct legal standard or 
uncommitted to advancing a particular legal standard. Third, there is still a significant gap 
between the norms that are actually implemented and the ones that are legitimized as law. 
Most States tolerate operations that they are not yet willing to validate with legal language”). 
310. See Daskal, supra note 301 (“Assuming, arguendo, acceptance of the unable or 
unwilling test, the U.S. legal argument is sound, so long as the force used is necessary to 
protect against the direct threat that ISIS poses to Iraq, and that the amount and nature of force 
is proportionate to suppressing that threat.”). 
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proportionate to protecting and suppressing ISIL’s threat in Iraq is 
factually questionable given that ISIL currently appears to be taking 
largely defensive positions.311 Further, the strikes undertaken against 
ISIL by the US appear on their face to target areas away from the 
Iraqi border.312 It would thus need to be substantiated that the strikes 
in Syria are defensive in nature, e.g., intended to cut off supply lines 
or other relief efforts for ISIL fighters in Iraq.313 As facts appear at the 
moment, it seems rather that many of the strikes launched in Syria 
had the different objectives of weakening ISIL’s presence in Syria, as 
such—rather than supporting Iraqi self-defense efforts.314 These 
strikes are largely consistent with the stated purpose of degrading and 
destroying ISIL in its own right (as opposed to as an immediate 
military threat to Iraq) and, though more tacitly, the United States 
hopes to support Syrian rebel forces against the Assad regime, as well 
as against ISIL.315 
2. Humanitarian Intervention 
Alternatively, it may also be possible to defend strikes against 
ISIL as a humanitarian intervention.316 Humanitarian intervention is 
not always clearly defined but typically refers to “the use of force by 
a state (or group of states) in another sovereign state’s territory to 
protect the host state’s citizens from . . . human rights abuses, mass 
                                                            
311.  Oren Dorell, ISIL Takes Body Blows in Iraq While Affiliates Grow Elsewhere, 
USA TODAY (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/04/21/isil-isis-
taking-body-blows-while-arms-grow-elsewhere/26134545/ (reporting that ISIL is taking “body 
blows” in Iraq and is rapidly losing territory in Iraq). 
312. Military Strikes Continue Against ISIL Terrorists in Syria and Iraq, DEPT. DEFENSE 
NEWS (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve 
(detailing strikes near Ar Raqqah). 
313. See Matthew Craig, Targeted Killing, Procedure, and False Legitimation, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2349, 2375 (2014) (“Proportionality requires that force be defensive and 
used only to the extent necessary to meet defensive military objectives. Necessity demands 
that there be no alternatives to the use of military force in response to the attack or threat.”). 
314. Coalition Continues Airstrikes Against ISIL in Syria, Iraq, DEP’T DEFENSE NEWS 
(Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128700 (“The strikes were 
conducted as part of Operation Inherent Resolve, the operation to eliminate the ISIL terrorist 
group and the threat they pose to Iraq, Syria, the region, and the wider international 
community. The destruction of ISIL targets in Syria and Iraq further limits the terrorist group's 
ability to project terror and conduct operations, officials said.”). 
315. More than 400 Military Personnel to Train Syrian Rebels, AL JAZEERA AM. (Jan. 
16, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/16/syria-rebels-training.html (reporting 
US decision to train Syrian rebels as part of the fight against ISIL). 
316. Trahan, supra note 16 (noting the potential humanitarian intervention justification). 
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atrocities, crimes against humanity, or genocide.”317 One particular 
form of humanitarian intervention, Responsibility to Protect, or R2P 
for short, has been invoked in the Syrian context.318 This rationale 
would look directly to the atrocities committed by ISIL against the 
civilian population in the areas it currently holds.319 This rationale has 
the benefit of a more genuine link to the concern of many of the 
coalition partners in fighting ISIL in the first place—i.e., to destroy a 
network sowing lawlessness and committing unspeakable human 
rights violations wherever it takes hold.320 But this rationale is 
similarly as fraught with legal difficulties as the collective self-
defense rationale. Thus, its status in international law remains highly 
contested.321 And, one might wonder, what is the need for a 
humanitarian intervention against a non-state actor to the extent the 
state in which non-state actor is perpetrating grave crimes is in fact 
willing and able to conduct operations against that non-state actor?322 
                                                            
317. Jonathan E. Davis, From Ideology to Pragmatism: China’s Position on 
Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 217, 221 
(2011); see also Daphné Richemond, Normativity in International Law: The Case for 
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 45, 46-7 (2003) 
(discussing the ambiguity of the current state of international law regarding humanitarian 
intervention). 
318. On the definition of R2P, see International Law – The Responsibility to Protect – 
Draft Security Council Resolution Referring Syrian Conflict to the International Criminal 
Court Vetoed by Russia and China (13 in Favor, 2 Against). – U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7180th 
Mtg. at 4, U.N. DOC. S/PV.7180 (May 22, 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (2015) (“In 
2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) proposed 
R2P, an international norm that answered this question by recasting sovereignty as a 
responsibility. The doctrine is not consistently defined, but the basic agreed-upon principles 
are: (1) a state has the primary responsibility to protect the individuals within it; (2) if the state 
is unable or unwilling to do so, the international community has a secondary responsibility to 
protect, acting primarily through the U.N.; and (3) the norm's foundational purpose--to bring to 
life ‘the notion that regardless of states' singular interest or lack of interest in intervention, 
individuals should never be allowed to suffer at the hands of their governments.’”). On recent 
developments regarding R2P in the Syrian context, see id. at 1055-59. 
319. Trahan, supra note 16 (noting the potential humanitarian intervention justification). 
320. See supra note 305. 
321. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention,” 93 
AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 824 (1999) (“In my view, unilateral intervention, even for what the 
intervening state deems to be important humanitarian ends, is and should remain unlawful.”); 
Jide Nzelibe, Courting Genocide: The Unitended Effects of Humanitarian Intervention, 97 
CAL. L. REV. 1171 (2009) (discussing the moral hazard in a humanitarian intervention rule 
because of the temptation of minority provocation of a majority group to force humanitarian 
intervention). 
322. See discussion supra Section III.B.1. This concern is particularly pressing in the 
R2P context, which appears to incorporate an unwilling-and-unable element into proposed 
R2Ps norms. See supra note 318. 
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The logic would be that the situation requires a humanitarian 
intervention against both the non-state actor (ISIL) and the state actor 
(Syria).323 It is questionable as a matter of policy whether a 
humanitarian intervention rationale is available without the 
commitment fully to see it through as a half-hearted humanitarian 
intervention does little to alleviate the problem and does a tremendous 
amount of additional damage.324   
3. Threat to the Integrity of International Law 
No matter the rationale, it seems that as Professor Craig Martin 
pointed out in the context of threatened military action against the 
Assad government for the regime’s use of chemical weapons, it 
appears that it is necessary to violate international law to protect 
international legal principles .325 In other words, it is not possible to 
maintain all international laws; the integrity of international law is 
threatened no matter how one acts.326 We have to choose between 
which international legal norms (sovereignty or basic international 
legal rights of the Syrian population) we wish to uphold and which 
international legal norms we wish to violate.327  
It thus again appears that lawlessness presents a particularly 
trenchant problem: under the current geopolitical circumstances at 
least, it is not formally possible to deal with lawlessness lawfully. 
From an international legal perspective, we are asked to choose 
between which fundamental rule of international law we wish to 
honor in the breach.328 It is thus not a question of “if” lawlessness is 
transferred from the municipal to the international plane, but of 
“how” this occurs. 
                                                            
323. See Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part II: 
International Law and the Way Forward), JUST SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2013), http://justsecurity.
org/1506/koh-syria-part2/ (arguing that intervention by the United States in Syria against the 
Syrian government could be justified on the ground of humanitarian intervention). 
324. See McCain, supra note 38 (pointing out this problem in proposed US military 
action in Syria). 
325. See Craig Martin, When Should We Violate International Law to Enforce It?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/craig-martin/when-should-
we-violate-in_b_3891117.html.  
326. See id. (“I would suggest that the fundamental criteria for determining if a violation 
of international law may be justified or excused on the grounds that it is necessary to address 
some other violation of the law, is the relative effects that the two illegal actions would have 
on the integrity of the legal system itself.”). 
327. See id. 
328. See id. 
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C. The Transnational Transference of Lawlessness—Comparing 
Syria and Iraq 
When the international legal issues of addressing the ISIL 
problem in Iraq and Syria are viewed individually, one might fairly 
surmise that the underlying problem is not so much ISIL’s 
lawlessness and more the indeterminacy of international law more 
generally.329 The comparison of both scenarios—the response to ISIL 
in Iraq and ISIL in Syria—reveals that lawlessness in fact presents a 
bigger challenge that exceeds the ordinary substantive indeterminacy 
of international law.330 The ISIL scenario permits one to isolate the 
various constitutive factors of lawlessness because of the cross-border 
implications of ISIL’s actions.331 In doing so, it is possible to map the 
transnational transference of lawlessness from the municipal to the 
international plane. 
1. Transnational Transference of Pragmatic Lawlessness 
The response to ISIL in Iraq showcases that pragmatic 
lawlessness of its own right does not create significant problems on 
the international plane.332 In principle, state consent to assist in the 
removal of the pragmatically lawless situation will permit 
international actors to assist.333 The control/authority dichotomy 
readily explains why.334 
At an early stage at least, pragmatic lawlessness simply 
represents a loss of control rather than a loss of authority of the 
requesting government.335 This loss of control threatens the capability 
of the requesting government to maintain basic law-and-order for its 
citizens internally and, in the context of serious instances of 
pragmatic lawlessness, to participate with the same efficacy in 
                                                            
329. For a discussion of a similar problem in the context of Ukraine, see Frédéric Gilles 
Sourgens, Functions of Freedom, Privacy, Autonomy, Dignity, and the Transnational Legal 
Process, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 471 (2015).  
330. See id. 
331. MARK CHANG, PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC METHODS 50 (2014) (“A key concept in 
experimentation is the factor isolation technique: the experimenter manipulates the 
experimental condition so that the outcomes come from two different conditions, with and 
without the main putative causes (independent variables), while other nuisance variables are 
balanced balanced using the technique called randomization.”). 
332. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
333. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
334. See supra Part I.A.2. 
335. See supra Part III.A. 
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international decision-making processes.336 The intervening state thus 
simply re-establishes the status quo already part of, and deemed 
authoritative through, the current state of international law. In this 
context, an international actor has the same authority in assisting the 
municipal government in establishing control as the municipal actor 
has itself.337 In a purely pragmatic lawlessness scenario, this suggests 
that both the international and municipal actor have full authority 
supporting their respective actions.338 
Two questions can arise. First, what would occur if municipal 
authoritative processes of decision support radically different 
constitutive values from those incorporated in international 
authoritative decision-making.339 Pragmatic lawlessness might erupt 
in a Taliban-like State (assume a gang of narco-traffickers seeks to 
use part of the country as a base of operations and terrorizes the local 
population without the ability of the Taliban-like State to re-assert 
control).340 Would an international actor be entitled to assist a 
Taliban-like regime that does not subscribe to basic human rights 
guarantees to all kinds of minorities in re-establishing its control over 
the area in question?341 The transnational transference thesis would 
answer this question in the affirmative in the sense that it is not the 
pragmatic lawlessness that creates the problem of intervention; it is 
rather the question whether any aid can be given to the Taliban-like 
regime. This question has little to do with the pragmatic lawlessness 
erupting in such a scenario. 
Second, what about situations, in which loss of control begins to 
affect loss of authority? The longer pragmatic lawlessness is 
permitted to exist, the stronger its effect on authority can become.342 
                                                            
336. Compare supra Part I.A.2 (defining control), with supra Part III.A (defining 
pragmatic lawlessness). 
337. See supra Part III.A. 
338. See supra Part III.A. 
339. See supra Part I.A.3. 
340. Such a scenario is not far-fetched. See Najibullah Gulabzoi, The Narco-State of 
Afghanistan, DIPLOMAT (Feb. 12, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-narco-state-of-
afghanistan/. 
341. A similar question arguably arose in the context of disaster relief in Myanmar 
following a major earthquake. See DREF Operation Update, Int’l Fed. Red Cross & Red 
Crescent Soc’y, Myanmar: Earthquake, Update No. 1 (May 5, 2011), http://www.ifrc.org/docs/
appeals/11/MDRMM00401.pdf. At the time, Myanmar had not yet begun a historic program 
of reforms and was therefore subject to significant international sanctions. See OFAC Fact 
Sheet, Dept. of the Treasury, Burma Sanctions Program (Jan. 29, 2014), at 3, 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/burma.pdf.  
342. See supra Part III.B. 
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People lose faith in a government incapable of exercising control for a 
prolonged time; this loss of faith is exacerbated if the government 
unsuccessfully uses ever more indiscriminate means to re-establish 
control, thus giving rise to a question whether formal lawlessness 
might not ensue.343 This scenario showcases that the lines between 
pragmatic and formal lawlessness are fluid.344 In fact, the situation in 
Iraq at the moment suggests, as Professor Akande and Vermeer 
correctly presaged, a loss of control that is at the tipping point 
towards formal lawlessness.345 Answering this question will begin to 
make relevant the concerns of a transnational transference of formal 
lawlessness discussed in the next Part, if to a lesser degree.346 Loss of 
authority transfers because the international actor can act only with 
the authority commensurate to the municipal actor. A loss of authority 
on the municipal level thus has international consequences. A simple 
return of the state actor to the same control as it had before the 
eruption of pragmatic lawlessness no longer would return the 
international community to the status quo ante precisely because of 
the intervening loss of authority of the home government with all the 
social consequences this entails.347 
2. Transnational Transference of Formal Lawlessness 
The Syrian situation readily demonstrates the first means by 
which formal lawlessness transfers from the municipal to the 
international plane. The consent of a formally lawless actor (the 
Syrian regime) is not a sufficient basis for an international actor to 
combat even serious pragmatic lawlessness (ISIL) on that regime’s 
formally sovereign territory (Raqqa).348 The transnational transference 
of pragmatic lawlessness looks to the authority of the home regime as 
a guarantee of the authority of international intervention.349 In a 
formally lawless regime, this is precisely absent.350 Pragmatic 
                                                            
343. See id. 
344. Cognitively, it is not possible to automate relevant responses. See Chad M. 
Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 881 (2012) 
(noting the importance of fluid intelligence in legal decision in contradistinction to automated 
responses to input). 
345. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
346. See infra Section IV.C.2. 
347. See supra Section I.A.2. 
348. See supra Section IV.B. 
349. See supra Section IV.C.1. 
350. See supra Section III.B. 
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lawlessness on the territory of a formally lawless actor thus requires 
some additional authority than simply the authorization of the 
formally lawless regime. 
This first consequence of transnational transference is practically 
instructive. It means that Russian intervention on the side of the 
Syrian regime against, for instance, the Free Syrian Army cannot be 
justified by reference to the consent of the Syrian regime.351 There 
would be no authority for such intervention because of the loss of 
authority of the Syrian regime.352 In this sense, formal lawlessness 
acts as a limit to subjective theories of the recognition of governments 
– as a matter of logic, it is impossible to recognize the government of 
a failed state as such a state is defined by the absence of effective or 
legitimate governance structures.353 
The Syrian situation also demonstrates a second, more 
significant means of transnational transference of lawlessness. Formal 
lawlessness sets up a clash between the sovereign (i.e., the state de 
jure ruled by the lawless regime) and core rights of its residents (i.e., 
their civil and political rights).354 The role of sovereignty in the 
international system has a constitutional nature.355 The UN system is 
premised upon the role of states, their formal equality, and the non-
interference in internal affairs of equal sovereigns.356 The role of core 
                                                            
351. Suleiman al Khalidi & Laila Bassam, In Moscow, Syrian Minister Says Russia 
Promises Aid, REUTERS, June 29, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/29/us-
mideast-crisis-hasaka-idUSKCN0P90VZ20150629 (“Syria's foreign minister said in Moscow 
on Monday Russia had promised to send political, economic and military aid to his country, 
where the army is coming under some of the heaviest pressure since the start of the civil 
war.”); Michael R. Gordon & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Moves to Block Russian Military Buildup in 
Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/09/world/europe/us-
moves-to-block-russian-military-buildup-in-syria.html (detailing both the Russian military 
buildup in Syria and the US attempts to thwart that buildup).  
352. See supra Section III.B. 
353. Compare CRAWFORD, supra note 183, at 722 (quoted above) with CRAWFORD, 
supra note 183, at 80 (discussing the distinctions between de facto and puppet governments). 
The thrust of the theorized account of formal lawlessness developed above is that by the time 
that an area has become not only pragmatically but fully formally lawless, any regime 
claiming to rule it has the international character of a puppet regime only (a regime that cannot 
request annexation or intervention) because the government is no longer de facto or otherwise 
de jure in power except for the support of the foreign power seeking to prop it up. Id. 
354. Dustin N. Sharp, Addressing Dilemmas of Global and Local in Transitional Justice, 
29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 71, 74 (2014) (noting a similar clash in the context of transitional 
justice development programs). 
355. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Constitutionalize International Law and Foreign 
Policy for the Benefit of Civil Society, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (1998) (noting the 
constitutional nature of sovereign equality in international law). 
356. See id. 
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human rights similarly is gaining constitutional value.357 It is one of 
the hallmarks of formal lawlessness or failed states that they precisely 
do not provide their residents with even the most basic guarantees 
such as the absence of arbitrary rule through imposition of sheer and 
brutal coercion, as, for instance, in the current Syrian scenario.358  
The transnational transference of formal lawlessness thus 
consists of requiring the resolution of a fundamental clash between 
weight-bearing parts of the international legal order.359 This is no 
longer possible by simply “applying” the law by means of a textual-
rule-based mode of decision-making.360 There is no rule that can 
remediate the clash.361 To answer the question thus requires 
application of a context-policy-based mode of decision-making.362  
The goals relevant to this inquiry include returning those subject 
to formally lawless power structures to authoritative rule, i.e., rule 
that is consistent with “participation in decision in accordance with 
community perspectives about who is to make what decisions, by 
what criteria, and by procedures; the reference is empirical, to a 
certain frequency in the perspectives of people who constitute a given 
community.”363 They also must include protecting regional stability, 
as well as global peace and security.364 They finally must look to 
finding a solution that is realistic in the sense of being enforceable so 
as to avoid a loss of authority of international law for failing to deal 
effectively with the crisis.365 Balancing these various goals will 
require significant creativity and vision as the goals themselves can 
run counter to each other in many instances.366 That being said, the 
greatest achievements in international peacekeeping of the late 20th 
century certainly have shown that such tasks can in fact be 
accomplished within legal confines.367 
                                                            
357. See id.; see also Destaw Yigzaw, Hunger and the Law: Freedom from Hunger as a 
Freestanding Right, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 655, n.97 (2014) (“Human rights possess constitutive 
value and must be protected regardless of instrumental considerations.”). 
358. See supra Section III.B. 
359. See Petersmann, supra note 355, at 12.  
360. See supra Section I.B. 
361. See supra Section I.B. 
362. See supra Section I.B. 
363. LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 26. 
364. See Jeremy Farrall, The Future of UN Peacekeeping and the Rule of Law, 101 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 160, 163 (2007). 
365. REISMAN, supra note 14, at 213. 
366. Id. at 185. 
367. Id. at 386. 
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3. Transnational Transference of Functional Lawlessness 
The transnational transference of functional lawlessness stakes 
out the limit of what international law can achieve. Functional 
lawlessness causes one of the constituent goals of the policy-context-
mode of decision-making to fail.368 This failure means that no legal 
decision can be fashioned in even this capacious mode of decision-
making.369 Instead, decisions must be made unaided by legal 
guidance—decisions that in ultimate consequence will be, in the sense 
of Niccolò Machiavelli or Carl Schmitt sense, dictatorial but, if well 
executed, ultimately vindicated.370 
The principal problem of applying a policy-context-based mode 
of decision making to functional lawlessness is that functional 
lawlessness has eviscerated the social fabric binding individuals 
together.371 Civil war has eviscerated the structures and processes 
necessary to recreate “participation in decision in accordance with 
community perspectives about who is to make what decisions, by 
what criteria, and by procedures” because “the reference is empirical, 
to a certain frequency in the perspectives of people who constitute a 
given community.”372 
The evisceration of authority within the local community means 
that the goal of returning a people to a government that is 
authoritative has now become logically impossible—the empirical 
reference point has been removed.373 This failure cannot be 
compensated for by simply focusing on the other goals of the policy-
context-based mode of decision-making such as regional stability, 
international peace and security, and maintaining the authority of 
international law.374 Blocking out the return of a people to 
authoritative governance structures is to treat it as a simple means 
towards international peace and security.375 Such a course of action is 
                                                            
368. Section IV.C.3. 
369. See supra Section I.B. 
370. SCHMITT, supra note 24, at 42; SKINNER, supra note 12, at 184. Carl Schmitt is a 
highly influential German right-wing critic of public international law (and public law in 
general). MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, THE RISE AND FALL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 at 239 (2001). For discussion of Schmitt, see supra notes 
23-24 above. For a discussion of Machiavelli, see supra note 12. 
371. See supra Section III.C. 
372. LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 43, at 26. 
373. Compare id., with supra Section III.C (defining functional lawlessness). 
374. See supra Section IV.C.2. 
375. See supra Section IV.C.2. 
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ultimately inconsistent with the demands of human dignity.376 Any 
course so deeply inconsistent with human dignity in turn cannot but 
corrode the authority of the decision making process adopting it.377 
This means that in the context of functional lawlessness, one 
must fashion a decision-making process that will become authoritative 
without a point of reference to existing community practices.378 It is 
to make the most fundamental form of decision for a community 
without its participation or consent.379 It can only be justified with 
hindsight.380 This constitutes one of the most intrusive forms of 
paternalistic domination imaginable.381  
This does not mean that inaction is an option. Both inaction and 
over-reaction are likely to corrode the authority of international legal 
processes.382 Most immediately, international law would visibly fail 
to take effective action to protect regional stability and international 
peace.383 In the case of inaction, law would lose authority because it 
would appear too weak to be meaningful in addressing the most 
significant international crises of our day.384 In the case of 
overreaction through excessive use of force, international law would 
lose authority by endorsing strategies that would seem patently unjust 
to most observers and thus create doubts about the legitimacy of 
international prescription in general.385 Functional lawlessness or 
configurations nearing it thus make action—decision—imperative to 
re-establish authoritative decision structures in the functionally 
lawless space.386 Dangerously, it requires the establishment of 
authority without authority for doing so. 
It is in this sense that the maintenance of international law 
requires a fundamental deviation from it. Schmitt (and Machiavelli) 
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are correct in noting that in such exceptional circumstances, “from the 
point of view of content of the underlying norm, the constitutive and 
specific moment of decision is both new and foreign. Decision, 
normatively, is born from nothingness. The legal force of decision is 
other than the result of its justification.”387 This decision is, as Schmitt 
predicted, both exceptional and dictatorial because it at the same time 
lacks and creates authority.388 With regard to such decisions, it is the 
end of successfully finding structures that can become authoritative 
that justifies the means to put them place – and nothing else.389 Even 
on the international level, law has met its end.  
CONCLUSION: A SKETCH FOR DEALING WITH LAWLESSNESS 
IN THE ISIL CONTEXT 
 
The Article so far has been largely critical. It has pointed out that 
the hope for municipal or international legal decision in dealing with 
ISIL is slender, if it exists at all.390 It has also pointed out that failure 
to act or overreaction would have disastrous consequences for 
international law more broadly.391 Lawlessness, far from being a 
license to do as one pleases, is an exception to lawful order that 
requires a tight rope act if one is to avoid doing lasting damage to all 
lawful order.392 But how is one to act in response to ISIL? 
What this Article has elucidated is that both scholarly exchanges 
and public debate focus on the wrong question: whether and how to 
wrest control of Syrian and Iraqi territory from ISIL.393 They thus 
focus on control.394 This focus on control loses something important 
from view: the underlying problem of both formal and functional 
lawlessness concerns authority, and not control;395 the Article has 
further shown that a reaction that is tailored first and foremost in 
terms of regaining control at all costs tends to exacerbate lawlessness 
rather than to cure it.396 
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The question thus becomes: how do we re-establish authority in 
the face of the calamities suffered by the peoples afflicted by formal 
and functional lawlessness in the Middle East?397 Conceptually, the 
answer to this question looks to defending and bolstering the 
capabilities for human development of the affected population both in 
situ and in diaspora.398 As human development research has shown, it 
is these capabilities that permit the bolstering of social structures in a 
fertile or exponential manner.399 The best answer thus looks to 
encouraging the capabilities of this population to self-govern again in 
the personal, economic, social, and political sphere.400 
The concluding Part of this Article sketches four strategies that, 
if combined, could be central to any project to protect the capabilities 
of the afflicted population and permit re-establishment authoritative 
decision-making processes in the future. First, it is imperative to 
maintain as much of the affected social fabric as possible so as to 
protect the predicate for future authoritative decision-making.401 This 
is currently not possible in-country in Syria and arguably beyond.402 It 
thus requires a concerted effort to treat refugees from the area 
responsibly, respectfully, and with a view to foster their human 
development.403 Failure to do so irreversibly destroys the ravaged 
social fabric and thus any chance for the re-introduction of 
authoritative decision-making through it. Just like in a ten-car pile up 
on a busy highway, the loss of a limb cannot be remedied at the 
scene; it is nevertheless important to keep as much of the severed 
limb intact to permit its later re-attachment to the body. Central to the 
success of any such endeavor is to provide educational opportunities 
to the refugees and the ability to earn a living wage while away from 
home.404 It further requires that every effort be undertaken to save as 
many people as possible from the clutches of the worst fighting rather 
than leaving the management of refugee streams to human 
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smugglers.405 It finally requires that the view of these refugees be 
taken into account in military and foreign policy decisions affecting 
their home to lessen the authority gap discussed in the previous 
Part.406 
The West, and particularly Europe, has been slow in taking the 
necessary steps to maintain the chance of future authoritative 
decision-making in the area. Middle Eastern and African refugees in 
France live in such horrid conditions as to attempt fleeing once 
again—this time from France to England.407 Refugees in East 
Germany are exposed to unacceptable xenophobic and anti-Semitic 
threats.408 Refugees from the Middle East drown on a regular basis by 
attempting passage to safer European shores because they rely on 
smugglers rather than other means of egress.409 Although European 
states have made facial strides to accept refugees from the area,410 so 
far the response has been to interdict safe-passage by land (and force 
refugees to take their own lives and the lives of their children in their 
own hands) rather than to ease this humanitarian crisis.411 In contrast 
                                                            
405. See Orlando Crowcroft, ISIS: Worst Refugee Crisis in a Generation as Millions 
Flee Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jun. 17, 2015), 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-worst-refugee-crisis-generation-millions-flee-islamic-state-iraq-
syria-1506613 (discussing the severity of the refugee crisis and the role of human smugglers).  
406. See Section IV.C.3. 
407. See Stephen Castle & Aurelien Breeden, Britain and France Scramble as Channel 
Becomes Choke Point in Migrant Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/07/30/world/europe/britain-and-france-scramble-as-channel-crossing-attempts-by-
migrants-continue.html (detailing the refugee crisis in Northern France). 
408. A Disgrace for Tröglitz, Refugee-Home Fire Spurs Xenophobia Fears, DER 
SPIEGEL (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-refugee-attack-and-
the-specter-of-xenophobia-in-germany-a-1027345.html (noting arson attacks on refugee 
facilities in Saxony-Anhalt). 
409.  Sarah Almukhtar et al., Mediterranean Sea, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2015, http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/20/world/europe/surge-in-refugees-crossing-the-
mediterranean-sea-maps.html (detailing the crisis). 
410. Compare Melissa Eddy, Angela Merkel Calls for European Unity to Address 
Migrant Influx, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/01/world/
europe/germany-migrants-merkel.html (reporting German Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel’s 
call for inclusion of refugees from the Syrian conflict), with Melissa Eddy, Rick Lyman & 
Alison Smale, Germany Orders Curbs at Border in Migrant Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/14/world/europe/germany-emergency-measures-euro
pean-migrant-crisis.html (reporting that “[w]ith record numbers of migrants pouring across the 
Hungarian border and rushing west, Germany, the country that had been the most welcoming 
in Europe, suddenly ordered temporary border restrictions on Sunday that cut off rail travel 
from Austria and instituted spot checks on cars.”). 
411. Sarah Almukhtar, Josh Keller & Derek Watkins, Closing the Back Door to Europe, 
N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/15/world/europe/
migrant-borders-europe.html.  
2015] THE END OF LAW 417 
to a military defeat of ISIL, changing these policies is eminently in 
Western control.412 Failing to change them is not to take seriously the 
erosion of authority structures in the Middle East and the dire need to 
combat it. 
The strides made—and unmade—in dealing with the refugee 
crisis are significant not only in the context of the humanitarian crisis 
for the Syrian civilian population.413 Rather, addressing this issue has 
significant implications for the national security of member states of 
the European Union and the United States. Policy efforts so far have 
not addressed this crucial link between the refugee crisis and the fight 
against ISIL, treating it instead as a migratory threat in its own 
right.414 A failure to continue to do so lends itself to disastrous 
consequences in medium and longer term. 
Second, authority-building strategies must be put into place 
while any war on ISIL is going on. This engagement is not one 
principally about territorial control;415 it is one about creating 
accountable and sustainable governance structures in a region deeply 
divided by sectarian distrust.416 Any successful attempt at re-
introducing authoritative decision-making processes must bridge this 
distrust and prejudice between Shi’ites and Sunnis, Kurds and Turks, 
Christians and Muslims, men and women, gay and straight in the 
region.417 One cannot hope to achieve this end quickly. But it must be 
attempted such as by expanding existing educational and outreach 
programs in the region so as to permit emergence of civic structures 
capable of supporting authoritative decision-making in the future.418 
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Third, coercive strategies must be aimed not only at military 
targets but also at protecting assets important to future authority 
structures. ISIL is actively destroying the human, intellectual and 
cultural patrimony of the region in order to erase any physical 
memory of a more inclusive social past.419 Interdicting this 
destruction has significant importance.420 Re-establishing 
authoritative decision-making processes will be a less difficult task 
the more of the patrimony can be saved and incorporated.421 And 
without those decision-making processes in place, ISIL (or its 
successor organizations) will quickly be able to raise both more 
troops and monetary support to maintain them.422 
To date, the response to ISIL has not addressed the protection of 
this important patrimony. In failing to do so, important myths and 
symbols of a unified, multi-religious and multi-ethnic Middle East are 
lost. Ceding the ground to ISIL’s purposeful destruction of these 
symbols is to allow ISIL to succeed in its attempts at re-definition of 
the local discourse that cannot be over-estimated; it is the erasure of 
millennia of history and regional identity central to the re-
establishment of authoritative governance structures. Or, to put it 
differently, one wonders what the state of European integration today 
would be had General Choltitz followed rather than refused the order 
to destroy Paris and make it “nothing but a blacked field of ruin” 
rather than letting it fall into Allied hands.423  
Fourth, international assistance must remain available in the 
long haul and must be aimed at re-growing local social structures 
rather than simply transplanting Western superstructures in their 
place.424 Such efforts require long-term economic, legal and 
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development support.425 Failing to commit now to such a long-term 
approach is again a failure to understand an authority problem and 
mistaking for a problem of insufficient control instead—with 
potentially as disastrous consequences as when the US failed to 
provide such assistance to Afghanistan following the mujahedeen’s 
military success to cause a withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989.426 
In sum, lawlessness as such does not represent a simple absence 
of control mechanisms as current policy responses to ISIL would have 
one believe.427 Lawlessness instead eviscerates the social fabric 
without which authoritative decision-making becomes impossible.428 
This loss of authority transfers transnationally with alarming speed 
not just in its corrosion of international legal mechanisms, as 
discussed in the Article so far, but socially; most noticeably in the 
current crisis, the inflow of Western fighters with no ties to the region 
or Islam on ISIL’s side of the conflict is just one symptom of such a 
broader contagion.429  
The current response even in the context of this social contagion 
has been to identify a source to attack and then apply coercive 
measures, in the case of Western fighters, social media and the 
Internet.430 As one famous semiotics professor pointed out in a 
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different context, this again is to fall prey to entirely too facile a 
misdiagnosis:  
The wretches who roam around aimlessly in gangs and kill 
people by throwing stones from highway bridges or setting fire to 
a child – whoever these people are – turn out this way not 
because they have been corrupted by computer “new speak” 
(they don’t even have access to a computer) but rather because 
they are excluded from the universe of literature and from those 
places where, through education and discussion, they might be 
reached by a glimmer from the world of values that stems from 
and sends us back again to books.431 
If we wish to turn back the national security threat that is ISIL, 
we can hope to succeed only if we combine this social perspective 
with the more traditional intelligence and military panache currently 
on display on both sides of the Atlantic. We must take seriously the 
corrosive effect of lawlessness on authority. And we must take 
seriously that this corrosive effect cannot be geographically contained 
but transfers transnationally entirely uninhibited by the coercive 
barriers placed its way until authoritative social structures have been 
repaired in their own right.  
POSTSCRIPT 
Shortly before this Article was due to go to press, three teams of 
extremists on November 13, 2015, committed several coordinated 
mass shootings and bombings in Paris.432 The mass shootings and 
bombings killed more than 132 persons and injured 415.433 
ISIL/Daesh has since claimed responsibility for the atrocities.434 
French President François Hollande called the November 13 events 
“un acte de guerre”—an act of war—and promised that France would 
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act “sera impitoyable”—without mercy—in its response.435 French 
Prime Minister Manuel Valls elaborated that “nous devons anéantir 
les ennemis de la République”—“we must annihilate the enemies of 
the Republic.”436 Much of what happened on November 13, 2015, at 
the time of writing this postscript, remains unclear. But a few salient 
points have even now emerged: 
First, Daesh’s lawlessness has found its way from Syria to 
Europe. Some of the November 13 murderers were radicalized French 
nationals inspired by Daesh,437 and others may have been hiding 
amongst the refugee population making its way from Syria to 
Europe.438 This suggests that the transnational transference of 
lawlessness latches both onto existing trends of radicalization in the 
West and refugee streams coming from the Middle East and Africa. 
As it stands, the events of November 13, 2015 have placed the 
refugee crisis brought on by Daesh center stage as a national security 
concern for the West. But a reaction that chiefly seeks to exclude 
refugees, kill terrorists, and control Middle Eastern territory, as 
advocated by some,439 will itself only fuel the transnational 
transference of lawlessness for much the same reasons as discussed 
above in the Syrian context: attempts to gain coercive dominion in the 
face of losses of authority in the affected social fabric, be it French or 
                                                            
435. Attaques à Paris: la France ‘Sera Impitoyable’ Contre l’EI, dit Hollande, LE 
MONDE, Nov. 14, 2015, http://mobile.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/11/14/attaques-a-paris-
francois-hollande-evoque-un-acte-de-guerre-commis-par-une-armee-terroriste_4809867
_3224.html. 
436. Manuel Valls: ‘nous devons anéantir les ennemis de la République,’ LE MONDE, 
Nov. 14, 2015, http://mobile.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/14/manuel-valls-
nous-devons-aneantir-les-ennemis-de-la-republique_4810179_4809495.html. 
437. Aurelien Breeden, Adam Nossiter & Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, Manhunt 
Underway as Investigation of Attacks Widens, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2015, http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/11/16/world/europe/paris-terror-attack.html?action=click&pgtype=
Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=span-abc-region&region=span-abc-
region&WT.nav=span-abc-region (“The Paris terrorist attacks were carried out with the help 
of three French brothers living in Belgium. . . . The first attacker to be identified by the 
authorities was Ismaël Omar Mostefaï, 29, a native of Courcouronnes, France, who had been 
living in Chartres, 60 miles southwest of Paris, and who, along with two other gunmen, killed 
89 people at the Bataclan concert hall.”). 
438. Id. (“One attacker — whose nationality is not yet known — evidently posed as a 
Syrian migrant.”). 
439. See Ben Schreckinger, GOP Candidates Link Paris Attacks to Immigration, 
POLITICO (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/paris-attacks-republicans-
immigration-trump-cruz-215895 (advocating exclusion of refugees and other immigrants from 
the U.S.); Theoderic Meyer, Rubio Sees a ‘Clash of Civilizations,’ POLITICO (Nov. 15, 2015), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/marco-rubio-paris-attacks-isil-215905 (advocating 
significantly increased coercive responses). 
422 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:355 
Syrian, only weaken the authoritative structures of the government 
seeking to apply coercive measures.440 The reaction ignores that much 
of the problem stems from the domestic disaffection that gives rise to 
homegrown radicalization and in so doing makes room for the 
transnational transference of lawlessness in the first place. 
Second, the French bellicose rhetoric suggests a French and/or 
NATO self-defense rationale for attacks in Syria against Daesh 
targets.441 This logic fails to convince for much the same reason as the 
collective self-defense rationale already utilized in the Iraqi context: 
there is little sense that attacks on Daesh in Syria will have any 
positive impact on ending future Daesh or Daesh-inspired violence in 
either Iraq or France.442 The alternative scenario of joint NATO and 
Russian use of force to support Assad’s regime might be a tempting 
military response to the perceived threat.443 It will do little to address 
the underlying causes of the lawlessness in the region. It will merely 
repress it for another day. 
Third, crimes such as the ones committed in Paris, in Beirut, in 
Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and beyond put us face to face with 
the dreaded powerlessness to stop atrocity and feel safe in our homes. 
It should instill a sense of solidarity in our shared loss. Instead, our 
dread turns to a thirst for unchecked violence against anything alien, 
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our “words had to change their ordinary meaning”—crime becoming 
war, revenge self-defense, victim collateral damage—and counsel 
frantic violence on all parts and moderation on none.444 It is still in 
our power to react with empathy and prudence so as to protect the 
authoritative nature of the very constitutive values of human dignity, 
which guided legal decision making since at least the end of the 
Second World War—but time is decidedly running short. 
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